Demo on synthetic data (Kaggle datasets named on each report). No real client data.

WoWyrd

WoWyrd · Rule review

Rule review: technical report

Client: Demo client with 3 business lines (synthetic). Data: 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31 (daily periods). Cut-off: 2017-01-31 (given with --cutoff). Generated: 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC.

Internal report. Do not share it outside your firm.

Method and definitions

The review measures what the client's own engine logged. It does not run the client's rules. To compare your own rule definitions with your engine's log, give the collector a rule file: Download an example rule file (JSON, with a note on every key; replace its example consent line before you use it). Label delay: 7 days. Hits newer than 2017-01-31 minus the label delay are not yet mature. One alert takes 6 analyst minutes at 0.80 USD per minute. A declined payment that was not fraud costs 4.00 USD in customer friction. The client entered these costs. Every cost in this report is an estimate from them.

Totals

MeasureValue
Transactions54,510
Alerts (transactions with at least one hit)54,425
Alerts not yet mature (newer than the label delay)2,674
Alerts on declined payments (no outcome; left out of precision)0
Confirmed fraud (label known by the cut-off)6,153
Confirmed fraud with at least one hit6,126
Evaluable fraud (mature, not declined)6,153
False alarms45,625
Declined payments with no fraud or disputed label (friction)0
False-alarm cost (estimate)219,000.00 USD
Rule-hit rows that matched a transaction54,510 of 54,510 (100.0%)
Label rows that matched a transaction7,940 of 7,940 (100.0%)

Source: transactions, rule-hit log and labels files, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31.

Per-rule metrics

Rules are sorted by false-alarm cost, highest first. The trend line shows precision per period.

RuleHitsNot yet matureDeclinedEvaluableCaughtFalse alarmsPrecisionRecall shareCost (USD)DecayedPrecision trend
Transfer above 500 USD tp_u21_transfer_over_500
Flags every transfer over a low fixed amount, so analysts see most mid-size transfers.
54,3672,674051,6936,11945,57411.8%99.4%89,664.00 USDNoPrecision per period for Transfer above 500 USD (Rule ID: tp_u21_transfer_over_500)Values per period, first to last: 4%, 7%, 88%, 63%, 74%, 5%, 7%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 9%, 11%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 10%, 11%, 65%, 82%, 68%, 64%, 44%, 42%, 59%, no data, no data, no data, no data, no data, no data, no data.
Single payment above 9,000 USD tp_u21_large_txn_9k
Flags any one large payment for a closer look.
52,6672,602050,0655,95644,10911.9%96.8%84,583.20 USDNoPrecision per period for Single payment above 9,000 USD (Rule ID: tp_u21_large_txn_9k)Values per period, first to last: 4%, 7%, 89%, 63%, 75%, 5%, 7%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 9%, 11%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 10%, 11%, 65%, 82%, 68%, 65%, 44%, 42%, 59%, no data, no data, no data, no data, no data, no data, no data.
Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d
Finds one account that collects money from many people, as a collection or mule account does.
28,1400028,14067827,4622.4%11.0%44,752.80 USDYesPrecision per period for Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) (Rule ID: tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d)Values per period, first to last: 1%, 2%, 57%, 33%, 47%, 1%, 2%, 1%, 2%, 2%, 2%, 3%, 2%, 2%, 3%, 2%, 2%, 28%, 64%, 9%, 12%, 0%.

Hits and precision per period

Each cell: hits / precision in that period.

Rule2017-01-012017-01-022017-01-032017-01-042017-01-052017-01-062017-01-072017-01-082017-01-092017-01-102017-01-112017-01-122017-01-132017-01-142017-01-152017-01-162017-01-172017-01-182017-01-192017-01-202017-01-212017-01-222017-01-232017-01-242017-01-252017-01-262017-01-272017-01-282017-01-292017-01-302017-01-31
Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d
Finds one account that collects money from many people, as a collection or mule account does.
3,946 / 1.1%2,649 / 2.4%70 / 57.1%149 / 32.9%103 / 46.6%2,685 / 1.3%2,296 / 2.2%2,439 / 1.4%2,116 / 1.9%1,958 / 2.0%1,901 / 1.5%1,485 / 2.6%1,697 / 1.9%1,297 / 2.3%1,228 / 2.5%963 / 2.1%1,049 / 1.9%67 / 28.4%22 / 63.6%11 / 9.1%8 / 12.5%1 / 0.0%0 / no data0 / no data0 / no data0 / no data0 / no data0 / no data0 / no data0 / no data0 / no data
Single payment above 9,000 USD tp_u21_large_txn_9k
Flags any one large payment for a closer look.
6,134 / 3.8%4,065 / 6.8%332 / 89.2%409 / 62.6%304 / 75.0%4,287 / 5.1%3,689 / 7.0%3,779 / 6.8%3,112 / 7.9%2,850 / 8.8%2,843 / 8.7%2,467 / 11.2%2,855 / 8.0%2,513 / 8.8%2,583 / 9.7%2,306 / 10.3%2,654 / 11.3%406 / 65.3%276 / 82.2%345 / 67.5%396 / 64.6%533 / 43.5%499 / 41.9%428 / 58.9%526 / no data347 / no data302 / no data302 / no data550 / no data309 / no data266 / no data
Transfer above 500 USD tp_u21_transfer_over_500
Flags every transfer over a low fixed amount, so analysts see most mid-size transfers.
6,354 / 3.8%4,206 / 6.9%335 / 88.4%419 / 62.5%317 / 74.4%4,431 / 5.1%3,808 / 6.9%3,904 / 6.7%3,231 / 7.7%2,952 / 8.8%2,928 / 8.6%2,558 / 11.1%2,929 / 7.9%2,590 / 8.9%2,667 / 9.6%2,360 / 10.4%2,727 / 11.2%416 / 64.7%288 / 81.6%358 / 67.9%400 / 64.5%546 / 43.6%514 / 41.8%455 / 59.3%546 / no data349 / no data315 / no data310 / no data569 / no data318 / no data267 / no data

What changed since the previous report

No previous report was given, so this report is treated as the first one. There is nothing to compare with yet. The next run can compare with this one: give it this folder with --previous.

Overlaps between rules

Rule ARule BJaccardTransactions hit by both
Single payment above 9,000 USD tp_u21_large_txn_9kTransfer above 500 USD tp_u21_transfer_over_5000.9752,667
Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dTransfer above 500 USD tp_u21_transfer_over_5000.5228,082
Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dSingle payment above 9,000 USD tp_u21_large_txn_9k0.5127,251

Rules that never fired

RuleInput fieldsStatus
Large payment on an account less than 30 days old tp_ffiec_new_account_large_30d
Finds big money movement on a newly opened account.
amount, account_age_daysInput absent: the transactions file has no account_age_days
Repeated large round-number transfers tp_ffiec_round_amounts
Finds a sender who keeps sending large, round amounts (a common money-laundering sign).
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
Many small payments in, then sent out within a day tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h
Finds an account that collects several small payments and passes most of the money on at once.
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
Dormant account suddenly moves more than 5,000 USD tp_u21_dormant_100d_5k
Finds an account that was quiet for months and then starts moving money, as when a taken-over or sold account is put to use.
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
Money sent to 5+ different recipients within 5 days (fan-out) tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d
Finds one sender spreading money to many receivers in a short time.
ts, sender_id, receiver_idInput present; the rule never fired
Spending in the last 3 days doubles the monthly norm tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31d
Finds a sender whose recent outgoing volume jumps far above their own usual level.
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
Money in, then almost all of it sent on within 3 days (layering) tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d
Finds an account that receives a large sum and quickly passes nearly all of it to other people.
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
10+ mid-size payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d
Finds a burst of many similar mid-size payments that add up to a large total.
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
20+ small payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total tp_u21_stats_20tx_0_1k_5d
Finds many small payments that together move a large sum.
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
Repeated payments just under 10,000 USD (structuring) tp_u21_structuring_9k_10k_5d
Finds payments kept just below a reporting limit to avoid a report.
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amountInput present; the rule never fired
More than 2 wire transfers in 7 days tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d
Finds a sender who uses wire transfers unusually often.
ts, sender_id, channelInput present; the rule never fired
Wire transfers above 4,999 USD in total within 7 days tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d
Finds a sender who moves a large total by wire in one week.
ts, sender_id, amount, channelInput present; the rule never fired

Proposals

No written effectiveness threshold was given. The retire line is the fraud rate of all payments with a known outcome.

Effects are backtests on past data, not forecasts.

Retire rule Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in): 2.4% of its 28,140 alerts with a known outcome were fraud

Reference REC-e9f0ff6e. Quote this reference in your change record.

Retire the ruleConfidence: mediumPriority: 59.98

Rules

Expected effect (backtest on past data): 58 fewer alerts, 7 caught fraud cases lost, 244.80 USD saved (estimate).

Evidence

  • Rule Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) fired 28,140 times. 28,140 alerts have a known outcome; 678 were fraud (2.4%).
  • The line is the fraud rate of all payments with a known outcome, 11.9% (6,153 of 51,812).
  • On 58 payments only this rule fired. 7 of them were fraud that no other rule caught. 0 are too recent to judge.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review) and UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel) come from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review)
  • UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel)
  • UK-FCA-02 (Test and review rules; a poorly calibrated rule set the firm cannot explain is poor practice)
  • US-FFIEC-01 (Tune and validate monitoring; justify each threshold)
  • US-NYDFS-01 (Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis)

Retire rule Transfer above 500 USD: 11.8% of its 51,693 alerts with a known outcome were fraud

Reference REC-0120446a. Quote this reference in your change record.

Retire the ruleConfidence: mediumPriority: 59.25

Rules

  • Transfer above 500 USD tp_u21_transfer_over_500
    Flags every transfer over a low fixed amount, so analysts see most mid-size transfers.

Expected effect (backtest on past data): 869 fewer alerts, 145 caught fraud cases lost, 3,129.60 USD saved (estimate).

Evidence

  • Rule Transfer above 500 USD fired 54,367 times. 51,693 alerts have a known outcome; 6,119 were fraud (11.8%).
  • The line is the fraud rate of all payments with a known outcome, 11.9% (6,153 of 51,812).
  • On 869 payments only this rule fired. 145 of them were fraud that no other rule caught. 72 are too recent to judge.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review) and UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel) come from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review)
  • UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel)
  • UK-FCA-02 (Test and review rules; a poorly calibrated rule set the firm cannot explain is poor practice)
  • US-FFIEC-01 (Tune and validate monitoring; justify each threshold)
  • US-NYDFS-01 (Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis)

Raise the review score from 1 to 2: 927 fewer alerts in the backtest

Reference REC-2ced524f. Quote this reference in your change record.

Retune the thresholdConfidence: mediumPriority: 54.22

Rules: none.

Expected effect (backtest on past data): 927 fewer alerts, 152 caught fraud cases lost, 3,374.40 USD saved (estimate).

Evidence

  • Backtest on past data. The lowest score that raised an alert is 1. 54,425 alerts went to review; 6,126 of them were fraud with a known outcome.
  • Score 2: 927 fewer alerts, 152 fraud cases no longer alerted, 3,374.40 USD saved, 72 removed alerts too recent to judge.
  • Score 3: 27,174 fewer alerts, 5,473 fraud cases no longer alerted, 91,329.60 USD saved, 2,674 removed alerts too recent to judge.
  • Proposed step: the highest score that loses at most 5.0% of caught fraud.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • Backtest on past data: a changed threshold can change how fraudsters behave.
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review) and UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel) come from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review)
  • UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel)
  • UK-FCA-02 (Test and review rules; a poorly calibrated rule set the firm cannot explain is poor practice)
  • US-FFIEC-01 (Tune and validate monitoring; justify each threshold)
  • US-NYDFS-01 (Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis)

Add a rule for: Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow

Reference REC-470735c7. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, mcc, operation_type.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S07 (Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S07 (Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow)

Add a rule for: Large loans are taken and repaid again and again

Reference REC-409090ac. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, operation_type, amount.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S05 (Large loans are taken and repaid again and again) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S05 (Large loans are taken and repaid again and again)

Add a rule for: One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity

Reference REC-0e811d6e. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, operation_type, amount.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S02 (One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S02 (One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity)

Add a rule for: Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code

Reference REC-6448ec99. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: mcc, payment_purpose.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • It cannot be covered on this data: the transactions file has no category-code or no payment-purpose column (see UA-NBU51-01 (The acquirer passes payee (merchant) name and category code to the issuer. Check that these fields are filled in your data. Most time-relevant item: the deadline is about 20.11.2026)).
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S11 (Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S11 (Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code)
  • UA-NBU51-01 (The acquirer passes payee (merchant) name and category code to the issuer. Check that these fields are filled in your data. Most time-relevant item: the deadline is about 20.11.2026)

Add a rule for: Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity

Reference REC-34bfe5f0. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: account_type, counterparty_id, ts, amount.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S08 (Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S08 (Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity)

Merge rule Transfer above 500 USD into Single payment above 9,000 USD: they overlap on 96.9% of their alerts

Reference REC-9dd6ee83. Quote this reference in your change record.

Merge overlapping rulesConfidence: mediumPriority: 49.25

Rules

Expected effect (backtest on past data): 869 fewer alerts, 145 caught fraud cases lost, 3,129.60 USD saved (estimate).

Evidence

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review) and UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel) come from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review)
  • UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel)
  • UK-FCA-02 (Test and review rules; a poorly calibrated rule set the firm cannot explain is poor practice)
  • US-FFIEC-01 (Tune and validate monitoring; justify each threshold)
  • US-NYDFS-01 (Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis)

Review rule Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in): its fraud share fell from 31.3% to 7.2%

Reference REC-cd8d1a00. Quote this reference in your change record.

Review a rule that lost precisionConfidence: mediumPriority: 40.0

Rules

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Rule Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in): the share of alerts with a known outcome that were fraud fell from 31.3% (2017-01-17 to 2017-01-19) to 7.2% (2017-01-20 to 2017-01-22).
  • Periods are by day. A fall to half or less over 3 periods counts as decay.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-04 (Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review) and UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel) come from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-01 (Review every rule at least monthly by back-testing it)
  • UA-NBU-05 (Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel)
  • US-NYDFS-01 (Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis)

Add a rule for: A large first payment to a payee never paid before

Reference REC-f5b6e1f7. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: payer_id, payee_id, amount.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • UK-FINANCE
  • UK-PSR

Add a rule for: A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closes

Reference REC-a414e3b2. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: merchant_id, mcc, merchant_onboarded_at, amount.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S09 (A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closes) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S09 (A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closes)

Add a rule for: Activity at hours unusual for the customer

Reference REC-b5cac26a. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, ts.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • NBU-DRAFT

Add a rule for: An older customer suddenly sends a large amount to a new payee

Reference REC-691bf0b5. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_age, payee_id, amount.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • FINCEN

Add a rule for: Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change often

Reference REC-bde66de3. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, device_id, ip, contact_changed_at.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S12 (Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change often) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S12 (Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change often)

Add a rule for: Credits from many different banks into one account

Reference REC-f4e5fd37. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: payee_id, payer_bank.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • FIU-UA
  • FINCEN

Add a rule for: Many senders' accounts share one beneficiary

Reference REC-82a0c21e. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: payer_id, payee_id.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • WOWYRD-SPIKE
  • FINCEN

Add a rule for: Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit)

Reference REC-af567191. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: merchant_id, direction, amount.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S10 (Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit)) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S10 (Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit))

Add a rule for: Money goes round in a circle between accounts within days

Reference REC-4f01a311. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: payer_id, payee_id, ts.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • FATF-REF
  • FIU-UA

Add a rule for: One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users

Reference REC-2392187c. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: device_id, customer_id.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S13 (One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S13 (One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users)

Add a rule for: One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar users

Reference REC-b7c65d36. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, account_id.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S01 (One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar users) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S01 (One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar users)

Add a rule for: The payee name does not match and the payment still goes

Reference REC-baa88b73. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: name_check_result.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • UK-PSR
  • EU-PSR

Add a rule for: The payment reference mentions investment, crypto or a 'safe account'

Reference REC-eebacaab. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: payment_purpose.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • UK-FINANCE

Add a rule for: Transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictions

Reference REC-0d627694. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: counterparty_country.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
Sources:
  • FATF-REF
  • FFIEC-APPF

Add a rule for: Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the time

Reference REC-3d1fe0d0. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 30.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, geo_location, ts.
  • None of the 15 rules in your catalogue matches this typology by name.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.

Caveats

  • Label maturity: 2,674 alerts are newer than the 7-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 1 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S14 (Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the time) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S14 (Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the time)

Below-the-line sample (AML rules)

No rule file was given, so there is no below-the-line sample. Give a rule file and mark your AML rules with "kind": "aml": Download an example rule file (JSON, with a note on every key; replace its example consent line before you use it).

Coverage by fraud type

Fraud types present in your labels

Fraud types present in your labelsType not given: 6,126 caught, 27 missedType not givenType not givenType not given: 6,126 caughtType not given: 27 missed6,126 caught, 27 missed
Labelled fraud cases per type. Blue: a rule fired on the payment. Orange: no rule fired. Source: labels file and rule-hit log, labels known by the cut-off.
Fraud typeLabelled casesCaughtMissedLibrary types it matchesYour rules' coverageWoWyrd
Type not given6,1536,12627noneUnknownWoWyrd rule: planned

Not in this dataset, so it cannot be measured here

Your labels hold no case of these types, so this data cannot show whether your rules catch them. This is not a gap in your rules. The rules column lists catalogue rules whose names match the type.

Library typeIDYour rules whose names matchSourcesWoWyrd
One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar usersUA-NBU-S01noneUA-NBU-S01WoWyrd rule: planned
One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activityUA-NBU-S02noneUA-NBU-S02WoWyrd rule available: One type of operation dominates an account operation_type_concentration
Many operations of one type in a short time, incoming or outgoingUA-NBU-S03Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dUA-NBU-S03WoWyrd rule available: Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h; A burst of operations of one type same_operation_type_burst
Balance stays low although large amounts pass throughUA-NBU-S04Many small payments in, then sent out within a day tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24hUA-NBU-S04WoWyrd rule available: Large amounts pass through an account that keeps a low balance low_balance_high_turnover
Large loans are taken and repaid again and againUA-NBU-S05noneUA-NBU-S05WoWyrd rule available: Large loans taken and repaid again and again loan_issue_repayment_churn
Money comes in and leaves fast, little balance staysUA-NBU-S06Many small payments in, then sent out within a day tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h, Money in, then almost all of it sent on within 3 days (layering) tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3dUA-NBU-S06WoWyrd rule available: Money leaves soon after it arrives rapid_pass_through
Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers followUA-NBU-S07noneUA-NBU-S07WoWyrd rule available: Gambling winnings with no gambling deposits gambling_winnings_without_deposits
Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activityUA-NBU-S08noneUA-NBU-S08WoWyrd rule available: A personal account paid by many payers personal_account_business_activity
A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closesUA-NBU-S09noneUA-NBU-S09WoWyrd rule available: A merchant with little history suddenly busy low_history_merchant_spike
Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit)UA-NBU-S10noneUA-NBU-S10WoWyrd rule available: A business account pays out almost all it receives business_account_transit
Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category codeUA-NBU-S11noneUA-NBU-S11WoWyrd rule available: Payment purpose does not fit the merchant's business payment_purpose_atypical_for_mcc; Card payment to a person without category or purpose acquiring_to_person_missing_data
Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change oftenUA-NBU-S12noneUA-NBU-S12WoWyrd rule available: Payout right after an email or phone change contact_change_to_payout; One session from several network addresses session_multiple_ips; One account used from many devices account_many_devices
One device fingerprint is used by unrelated usersUA-NBU-S13noneUA-NBU-S13WoWyrd rule available: One device used by several customers multi_account_device
Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the timeUA-NBU-S14noneUA-NBU-S14WoWyrd rule available: Locations too far apart for the time between them impossible_travel
One payer sends to far more payees than similar payersUA-NBU-S15Money sent to 5+ different recipients within 5 days (fan-out) tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5dUA-NBU-S15WoWyrd rule available: One account pays many different payees account_many_payees
Many payers send to one payee, far more than for similar payeesUA-NBU-S16Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dUA-NBU-S16WoWyrd rule available: Many senders pay one account inbound_sender_fan_in; One payee shared by several customers beneficiary_reuse
Many different senders pay one account within a short timeOR-01Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dFINCEN, FFIEC-APPF, UNIT21WoWyrd rule available: Many senders pay one account inbound_sender_fan_in
Most of an incoming amount leaves again within hoursOR-02Many small payments in, then sent out within a day tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h, Money in, then almost all of it sent on within 3 days (layering) tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3dFINCEN, EUROPOL-EMMA, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule available: Money leaves soon after it arrives rapid_pass_through
A new account gets large or many credits soon after openingOR-03Large payment on an account less than 30 days old tp_ffiec_new_account_large_30dUNIT21, UK-FINANCEWoWyrd rule available: A new account receives a large credit new_account_large_incoming_credit; A new account paid by several people new_account_inbound_fan_in
A dormant account suddenly moves large amountsOR-04Dormant account suddenly moves more than 5,000 USD tp_u21_dormant_100d_5kFFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule: planned
Repeated amounts just under a reporting or limit thresholdOR-0510+ mid-size payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d, 20+ small payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total tp_u21_stats_20tx_0_1k_5d, Repeated payments just under 10,000 USD (structuring) tp_u21_structuring_9k_10k_5dFFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule available: Payments just under a limit just_below_threshold_payment; Many small payments from one account add up to a large sum amount_structuring_account; Many small payments to one payee add up to a large sum amount_structuring_beneficiary
Repeated round amounts with no business reasonOR-06Repeated large round-number transfers tp_ffiec_round_amountsFFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule available: Several payments in large round amounts repeated_round_amounts
One account pays many new beneficiariesOR-07Money sent to 5+ different recipients within 5 days (fan-out) tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5dFINCENWoWyrd rule available: One account pays many different payees account_many_payees
Outgoing payments per hour above the customer's usual levelOR-08Spending in the last 3 days doubles the monthly norm tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31dUNIT21, EBA-GL-2021-02WoWyrd rule available: More payments in an hour than the customer usually makes high_customer_velocity_1h; Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h
A large first payment to a payee never paid beforeOR-09noneUK-FINANCE, UK-PSRWoWyrd rule available: A large payment to a payee added just before new_payee_high_amount
Many senders' accounts share one beneficiaryOR-10noneWOWYRD-SPIKE, FINCENWoWyrd rule available: One payee shared by several customers beneficiary_reuse
Money goes round in a circle between accounts within daysOR-11noneFATF-REF, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule: planned
An amount far above the customer's own historyOR-12Spending in the last 3 days doubles the monthly norm tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31dEBA-GL-2021-02, NBU-DRAFTWoWyrd rule available: A payment far above the customer's usual amount amount_far_above_customer_average
Many small credits, then one large debitOR-13Many small payments in, then sent out within a day tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24hEUROPOL-EMMA, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule available: Many small credits, then one large payout many_small_credits_then_large_payout
Credits from many different banks into one accountOR-14noneFIU-UA, FINCENWoWyrd rule available: Credits from many different banks into one account inbound_from_many_banks
Transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictionsOR-15noneFATF-REF, FFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule available: A payment to or from a high-risk country high_risk_jurisdiction_counterparty
Cash withdrawn right after a credit arrivesOR-16Spending in the last 3 days doubles the monthly norm tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31dFINCEN, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule available: Cash taken out soon after money arrives cash_withdrawal_after_credit
The payee name does not match and the payment still goesOR-17noneUK-PSR, EU-PSRWoWyrd rule available: Paid although the payee name did not match payee_name_mismatch_paid
The payment reference mentions investment, crypto or a 'safe account'OR-18noneUK-FINANCEWoWyrd rule available: The payment reference uses common scam wording payment_reference_scam_wording
An older customer suddenly sends a large amount to a new payeeOR-19noneFINCENWoWyrd rule available: An older customer sends a large amount to a new payee older_customer_new_payee_large
Activity at hours unusual for the customerOR-20noneNBU-DRAFTWoWyrd rule available: Activity at an hour unusual for the customer unusual_hour_for_customer

New in our reference set since your last report

Our reference set: version v0.7.0, published 2026-11-18 (built into this collector).

This is the first report with a record of our reference set. The next report lists what is new since this one.

Incoming payments and money-mule signs

Incoming payments not measured: your transactions file has no direction column (for example direction, with values such as in and out).

Requirements changed since the last review

Your rules are mapped to current requirements. We flag when a new requirement affects them. We follow official publications of regulators in Ukraine, the EU, the UK and the US.

Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.

Requirements library read on 2026-11-11. No change file was given for this run, so no changed requirement is listed here.

Requirements still open since the previous report

No previous report was given, so this report is treated as the first one. There is nothing to compare with yet. The next run can compare with this one: give it this folder with --previous.

Requirements that showed a gap are followed up only when the two reports compare.

Not legal advice. Your compliance team decides how a requirement applies to you. Public cases show how regulators have treated the same kind of gap; they do not predict an outcome for you.

Regulatory checks by regulator

Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.

Regulatory statuses as of 2026-11-11 (library date). Check them again before you rely on this report.

Checks are grouped by the regulator that sets the requirement. Each row gives the requirement ID, our own short wording of it, the result on your files, and the source's status on the date shown. Our wording is a summary, not the regulator's text.

Checks per NBU requirements

Rows citing the NBU draft of 17.07.2026 — draft, not in force: its text can change before adoption. Resolutions 51, 54 and 116 are in force. Bill 16013 is a Ukrainian bill, shown here with its status.

Requirement IDNBU draft paragraphOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
UA-NBU51-01—The acquirer passes payee (merchant) name and category code to the issuer. Check that these fields are filled in your data. Most time-relevant item: the deadline is about 20.11.2026.Not measurable from these filesYour transactions file has no payee-name or category-code column. Add them to the export so this can be measured. Without them no rule can check payment purpose against category code.Transactions file: 54,510 rows; columns checked: payee_name, merchant_name, recipient_name, receiver_name, beneficiary_name, mcc, merchant_category_code.in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-01§66Review every rule at least monthly by back-testing it. (NBU draft §66; library item UA-NBU-01.)GapThe data covers 1 calendar month(s), 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31. A monthly back-test needs one run per month; a trend needs 6 months. This run splits the data by day into 31 periods.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-02§60Metric 1: compare how often each rule fired with how many payments were actually stopped. (NBU draft §60(1); library item UA-NBU-02.)GapMeasured: 0.0% although alerts exist. 3 rules fired 135,174 times; 0 of those hits were on stopped payments (0.0%). The per-rule table is in the technical report.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days. First rules: Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) 28,140 hits, 0 stopped; Single payment above 9,000 USD 52,667 hits, 0 stopped; Transfer above 500 USD 54,367 hits, 0 stopped.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-03§60Metric 2: share of fraud value that was prevented, out of all fraud value. (NBU draft §60(2); library item UA-NBU-03.)GapMeasured: 0.0% although alerts exist. Fraud value stopped: 0.0% (0.00 of 8,743,731,424.90 USD). Fraud value with any alert: 100.0% (8,743,726,297.91 USD). Whether reviewed alerts were stopped is not in the decision log.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days. 6,153 payments labelled fraud.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-04§62Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review. (NBU draft §62; library item UA-NBU-04.)GapNo written effectiveness threshold was given. As a pointer: 2 of 3 rules with at least 30 alerts with a known outcome catch fraud at or under the base fraud rate of 11.9%.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-05§68–69Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel. (NBU draft §68–69; library item UA-NBU-05.)Partly metNo recorded decisions in your files. Recommended decisions: cancel 2, adjust 0, keep 1. 0 rules have fewer than 30 alerts with a known outcome, so no decision is recommended. The decision itself is yours to record.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-11—Have evidence ready for a supervisor: documents, rules, risk markers.Partly metThis report maps each finding to a requirement ID and its status (20 requirements). Your written rules, risk markers and staff interviews stay with you.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU51-02—Show the acquirer's full name before an online payment; receipts show payee, commission, purpose and category code.Not measurable from these filesNo acquiring payment was found (operation_type purchase, or a card channel). This checks the data in your export, not your payment page or your receipts. Showing the acquirer's full name before an online payment stays a checklist question.Transactions file, 54,510 rows.in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-09—Reconcile payment operations every day.Partly metDays reviewed: 31 (2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31; UTC days). Days with no payments: 0. Payments with no row in the rule-hit log: 0. Rule-hit rows with no payment: 0. No ledger was given, so amounts were not reconciled. Give your settlement or ledger export with --ledger to reconcile them. This checks your exports. Whether your staff reconcile every day is a process question: answer it in the assessment checklist.Transactions file and rule-hit log, by UTC day.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU51-03—Acquiring for natural persons only for allowed categories, with the required data passed to the issuer.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU54-01—Non-bank providers that acquire payments need an authorisation; the sanctions pause has ended.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force; grace period ended 02.09.20262026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU116-01—Remote verification of natural persons uses the updated procedure with credit-bureau data.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force since 10.10.2026; 3 months to align internal procedures (about 10.01.2027)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU116-02—Reports to the State Financial Monitoring Service go only through the e-cabinet, with numbered registers.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force since 10.10.2026; 3 months to align internal procedures (about 10.01.2027)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-16013-01—Passing cards, account access or payment data to fraudsters becomes a crime. Detect and restrict accounts used as drops.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.adopted by the Rada 28.10.2026; presidential signature not confirmed2026-11-11itd.rada.gov.ua

Checks per EU requirements

Requirement IDOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
EU-PSR-05When a payee name check fails because of the payee's provider, that provider compensates the payer's provider. Keep evidence of the name check on received transfers.Not measurable from these filesYour transactions file has no payee name-check result. Add it to measure received transfers with a name mismatch or no check.Columns looked for: name_check_result, payee_check_result, cop_result, vop_result, name_check.agreed, not adopted (EU Payment Services Regulation; adoption expected by 12.2026)2026-11-11oeil.europarl.europa.eu

Checks per UK requirements

Requirement IDOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
UK-PSR-03A claim may carry an excess of up to 100 GBP, never for vulnerable customers.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force2026-11-11psr.org.uk
UK-FCA-02Test and review rules; a poorly calibrated rule set the firm cannot explain is poor practice.Partly met5 rules or thresholds look poorly calibrated on your data (merge 1, retire 2, retune 1, review_decay 1); 12 catalogue rules never fired. Every proposal gives a plain-word reason.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.guidance in force2026-11-11fca.org.uk

Checks per US requirements (FinCEN, NYDFS, FFIEC, Nacha, Federal Reserve)

FinCEN and Nacha items are not checked from your files in this run; the rows below are NYDFS and FFIEC items.

Requirement IDOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
US-NYDFS-01Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis.Partly metThis run analyses 3 rules over 31 periods by day (1 calendar month(s)). Ongoing analysis means running it every month.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.in force2026-11-11dfs.ny.gov
US-NYDFS-02Test rules before and after they go live.Not measurable from these filesThe files do not show when each rule went live, so before-and-after tests cannot be checked. A replay of a new rule on past data can serve as the test before go-live.Rule catalogue has no go-live date.in force2026-11-11dfs.ny.gov
US-FFIEC-01Tune and validate monitoring; justify each threshold.Partly met5 tuning proposals (merge 1, retire 2, retune 1, review_decay 1). Each states its evidence on past data.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31, labels known by 2017-01-31, label delay 7 days.guidance2026-11-11bsaaml.ffiec.gov

Other checks

No other checks in this run.

Run record

The files, code and parameters of this run, so it can be repeated.

ItemValueSource
Input file: cataloguedf35f17dbf43833a1e61c25563e57f6acfacb60e533a103387a697a45eb8fc6dSHA-256
Input file: costs30f762bad066b62dfcb20d236f03995ea3edf0f809c04e934cdb957f3f4de2c4SHA-256
Input file: decisions478c1fcd2e5ea2286bace3a124f343280535660a6500a73c55df28b939000e5dSHA-256
Input file: labels9f116294ba8270bf7c932b4f31c59778e80e5e72f9e5d55cea96ce809553a35dSHA-256
Input file: transactions74b28df3ad96d7092c8b1d3293d38d9881d3bbfca834fc0c02575a66a7414ebcSHA-256
Collector versionv0.7.0-11-gba7bd7b03d5199dd42d1810a9e4294cde08c03a4git commit
Generation time2026-11-20 10:02 UTCrun time
cutoff2017-01-31T23:00:00+00:00client
label delay days7client
min cell10default
min join coverage0.95default
perioddayclient
thresholdnot givennot given
tokens for all rulesFalsedefault
Regulatory library2026-11-11statuses as of this date
Requirement change filenot given--changes
Tool mapnot given--tools or a tool column in the catalogue
Ledger exportnot given--ledger
Reference set sourcebuilt into this collector
Reference set versionv0.7.0published 2026-11-18
Reference set filee96e792983d3748de554ba3b49a15291c8d4110f1778795555caff0fa81ee119SHA-256

Rule glossary

Each rule in this review, in plain words: what it detects, the fraud type it guards against, when it fires, where it comes from, and the data it needs.

10+ mid-size payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total Rule ID: tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d

What it detects
Finds a burst of many similar mid-size payments that add up to a large total.
Fraud type it guards against
Money laundering (many similar payments); structuring
When it fires
10 or more payments in 5 days, each 1,000 to 3,000 USD on average, more than 20,000 USD in total.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

20+ small payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total Rule ID: tp_u21_stats_20tx_0_1k_5d

What it detects
Finds many small payments that together move a large sum.
Fraud type it guards against
Money laundering (smurfing); structuring
When it fires
20 or more payments in 5 days, up to 1,000 USD each on average, more than 20,000 USD in total.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

Dormant account suddenly moves more than 5,000 USD Rule ID: tp_u21_dormant_100d_5k

What it detects
Finds an account that was quiet for months and then starts moving money, as when a taken-over or sold account is put to use.
Fraud type it guards against
Account takeover; mule account
When it fires
No activity for more than 100 days, then more than 5,000 USD in or out within 5 days.
Source
Unit21 open rule library; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

Large payment on an account less than 30 days old Rule ID: tp_ffiec_new_account_large_30d

What it detects
Finds big money movement on a newly opened account.
Fraud type it guards against
New-account fraud; mule account
When it fires
A payment of at least 10,000 USD where the sender or receiver account is 30 days old or less.
Source
FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
Data fields it needs
amount, account_age_days

Many small payments in, then sent out within a day Rule ID: tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h

What it detects
Finds an account that collects several small payments and passes most of the money on at once.
Fraud type it guards against
Mule account; money laundering (pass-through)
When it fires
3 or more incoming payments under 3,000 USD within 24 hours, then at least 80% of their total goes out within the same 24 hours.
Source
FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) Rule ID: tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d

What it detects
Finds one account that collects money from many people, as a collection or mule account does.
Fraud type it guards against
Mule account; scam proceeds collection
When it fires
One receiver gets money from 5 or more different senders within 5 days.
Source
FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id

Money in, then almost all of it sent on within 3 days (layering) Rule ID: tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d

What it detects
Finds an account that receives a large sum and quickly passes nearly all of it to other people.
Fraud type it guards against
Money laundering (layering); mule account
When it fires
At least 10,000 USD comes in, and at least 90% of it goes out to other receivers within 3 days.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

Money sent to 5+ different recipients within 5 days (fan-out) Rule ID: tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d

What it detects
Finds one sender spreading money to many receivers in a short time.
Fraud type it guards against
Money laundering (dispersal); mule network
When it fires
One sender pays 5 or more different receivers within 5 days.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id

More than 2 wire transfers in 7 days Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d

What it detects
Finds a sender who uses wire transfers unusually often.
Fraud type it guards against
Money laundering through wires
When it fires
One sender makes more than 2 wire transfers within 7 days.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, channel

Repeated large round-number transfers Rule ID: tp_ffiec_round_amounts

What it detects
Finds a sender who keeps sending large, round amounts (a common money-laundering sign).
Fraud type it guards against
Money laundering; payments with no real purchase behind them
When it fires
One sender makes 3 or more transfers of at least 1,000 USD in whole hundreds within 30 days.
Source
FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

Repeated payments just under 10,000 USD (structuring) Rule ID: tp_u21_structuring_9k_10k_5d

What it detects
Finds payments kept just below a reporting limit to avoid a report.
Fraud type it guards against
Structuring (avoiding the reporting threshold)
When it fires
One sender makes 2 or more payments between 9,000 and 10,000 USD within 5 days.
Source
Unit21 open rule library; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

Single payment above 9,000 USD Rule ID: tp_u21_large_txn_9k

What it detects
Flags any one large payment for a closer look.
Fraud type it guards against
Large-value money laundering
When it fires
One payment is more than 9,000 USD.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
amount

Spending in the last 3 days doubles the monthly norm Rule ID: tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31d

What it detects
Finds a sender whose recent outgoing volume jumps far above their own usual level.
Fraud type it guards against
Account takeover; sudden cash-out
When it fires
The daily average sent over the last 3 days is more than twice the daily average over the last 31 days.
Source
Unit21 open rule library; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount

Transfer above 500 USD Rule ID: tp_u21_transfer_over_500

What it detects
Flags every transfer over a low fixed amount, so analysts see most mid-size transfers.
Fraud type it guards against
General transfer monitoring (no specific fraud type)
When it fires
One transfer is more than 500 USD.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
amount

Wire transfers above 4,999 USD in total within 7 days Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d

What it detects
Finds a sender who moves a large total by wire in one week.
Fraud type it guards against
Money laundering through wires
When it fires
One sender's wire transfers add up to more than 4,999 USD within 7 days.
Source
Unit21 open rule library
Data fields it needs
ts, sender_id, amount, channel

Fraud types in plain words

Each fraud type named in your labels, in one sentence. The word in small grey text is the label as your file gives it.

Type not given no type
Fraud labels in your file that do not say which kind of fraud it was.