Demo on synthetic data (Kaggle datasets named on each report). No real client data.

WoWyrd

WoWyrd · Rule review

Rule review: technical report

Client: Demo client with its own rule file (own-rules, synthetic). Data: 2026-08 to 2026-10 (monthly periods). Cut-off: 2026-10-01 (given with --cutoff). Generated: 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC.

Internal report. Do not share it outside your firm.

Method and definitions

The review measures what the client's own engine logged. Only the section "Your imported rules" replays the rule definitions the client gave, and that replay never replaces a logged number. Label delay: 14 days. Hits newer than 2026-10-01 minus the label delay are not yet mature. One alert takes 6 analyst minutes at 0.80 USD per minute. A declined payment that was not fraud costs 4.00 USD in customer friction. The client entered these costs. Every cost in this report is an estimate from them.

Totals

MeasureValue
Transactions1,950
Alerts (transactions with at least one hit)723
Alerts not yet mature (newer than the label delay)140
Alerts on declined payments (no outcome; left out of precision)80
Confirmed fraud (label known by the cut-off)103
Confirmed fraud with at least one hit82
Evaluable fraud (mature, not declined)66
False alarms450
Declined payments with no fraud or disputed label (friction)42
False-alarm cost (estimate)2,328.00 USD
Rule-hit rows that matched a transaction1,950 of 1,950 (100.0%)
Label rows that matched a transaction639 of 639 (100.0%)

Source: transactions, rule-hit log and labels files, 2026-08 to 2026-10.

Per-rule metrics

Rules are sorted by false-alarm cost, highest first. The trend line shows precision per period.

RuleHitsNot yet matureDeclinedEvaluableCaughtFalse alarmsPrecisionRecall shareCost (USD)DecayedPrecision trend
tp_u21_transfer_over_500
No description supplied by the client
70113871492414438.5%62.1%2,092.07 USDNoPrecision per period for tp_u21_transfer_over_500 (Rule ID: tp_u21_transfer_over_500)Values per period, first to last: 10%, 6%, no data.
tp_u21_large_txn_9k
No description supplied by the client
8015956193634.5%28.8%90.93 USDNoPrecision per period for tp_u21_large_txn_9k (Rule ID: tp_u21_large_txn_9k)Values per period, first to last: 34%, 35%.
tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d
No description supplied by the client
951580000no data0.0%83.67 USDNoPrecision per period for tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d (Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d)No period has evaluable hits.no data
tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d
No description supplied by the client
24701711664.7%16.7%23.20 USDNoPrecision per period for tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d (Rule ID: tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d)Values per period, first to last: 73%, 0%.
tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d
No description supplied by the client
25412013765.0%19.7%20.20 USDNoPrecision per period for tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d (Rule ID: tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d)Values per period, first to last: 60%, 80%.
tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d
No description supplied by the client
2201842250.0%3.0%17.93 USDNoPrecision per period for tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d (Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d)Values per period, first to last: 67%, 0%.

Hits and precision per period

Each cell: hits / precision in that period.

Rule2026-082026-092026-10
tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d
No description supplied by the client
15 / 73.3%9 / 0.0%0 / no data
tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d
No description supplied by the client
16 / 60.0%9 / 80.0%0 / no data
tp_u21_large_txn_9k
No description supplied by the client
41 / 34.3%39 / 35.0%0 / no data
tp_u21_transfer_over_500
No description supplied by the client
373 / 9.6%318 / 6.2%10 / no data
tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d
No description supplied by the client
20 / 66.7%2 / 0.0%0 / no data
tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d
No description supplied by the client
51 / no data44 / no data0 / no data

What changed since the previous report

Compared with the previous report, which covers data up to 2026-08-27 (35 days earlier). Its numbers are as measured at its own cut-off: labels that matured later are not added to it.

Per rule

Sorted by the size of the change in alerts, largest first. Precision is shown only with at least 30 hits with a known outcome in each run. Hit rate = alerts / transactions.

RuleAlerts thenAlerts nowChangePrecision thenPrecision nowChangeHit rate thenHit rate now
tp_u21_transfer_over_500324701+116%3.3%8.5%+5.1 points37.6%35.9%
tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d3295+197%no datano datanot measured3.7%4.9%
tp_u21_large_txn_9k3680+122%no data34.5%not measured4.2%4.1%
tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d522+340%no datano datanot measured0.6%1.1%
tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d1525+67%no datano datanot measured1.7%1.3%
tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d1524+60%no datano datanot measured1.7%1.2%
R-50900no changeno datano datanot measured0.0%0.0%
R-61000no changeno datano datanot measured0.0%0.0%
R-90000no changeno datano datanot measured0.0%0.0%

Rules added and removed

Added: none.

Removed: none.

Threshold changes

No threshold changed.

Requirements

No requirement file was given for this run, so requirement changes are not compared.

Recommendations from the previous report

Of the previous report's 7 recommendations: 0 changed as proposed, 0 partly changed, 2 not changed, 5 where we cannot tell.

Too few dated changes for a median (0; at least 3 needed).

Open recommendations by age: 7 up to 30 days, 0 of 31–90 days, 0 over 90 days.

Days count from the first report that made each recommendation. A change dated before that report, a change with no exact date and an upper bound ("at most") are shown but not counted. This is a measurement on your own records, not a judgement of your change process.

ReferenceNo. in the previous reportRecommendationStatusSourceChange dateFirst recommendedDays to changeDatesBefore → afterPredictedAgainst the prediction
REC-733094771Turn off rule tp_u21_transfer_over_500Not changed.your rule filenot known2026-11-20, in 1 reportopen 0 days, in 1 report—Not measured.Predicted: 9.5 fewer alerts per day (estimated on your data).—
REC-16a49a982Add a rule for: Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers followCannot tell: no change record or rule file covers it, and your data cannot show this kind of change.nonenot known2026-11-20, in 1 reportopen 0 days, in 1 report—Not measured.No effect was estimated for this recommendation.—
REC-fc5701c93Add a rule for: Large loans are taken and repaid again and againCannot tell: no change record or rule file covers it, and your data cannot show this kind of change.nonenot known2026-11-20, in 1 reportopen 0 days, in 1 report—Not measured.No effect was estimated for this recommendation.—
REC-5ff2bbff4Add a rule for: One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activityCannot tell: no change record or rule file covers it, and your data cannot show this kind of change.nonenot known2026-11-20, in 1 reportopen 0 days, in 1 report—Not measured.No effect was estimated for this recommendation.—
REC-8078ec065Add a rule for: Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category codeCannot tell: no change record or rule file covers it, and your data cannot show this kind of change.nonenot known2026-11-20, in 1 reportopen 0 days, in 1 report—Not measured.No effect was estimated for this recommendation.—
REC-05f946b26Add a rule for: Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activityCannot tell: no change record or rule file covers it, and your data cannot show this kind of change.nonenot known2026-11-20, in 1 reportopen 0 days, in 1 report—Not measured.No effect was estimated for this recommendation.—
REC-d74333d37Rule tp_u21_transfer_over_500, check 1: threshold 500 → 1000Not changed.your rule filenot known2026-11-20, in 1 reportopen 0 days, in 1 report—Not measured.Predicted: 0.9 fewer alerts per day (backtest on past data).—

Observed after the change, not proven to be caused by it. Traffic, fraud patterns and other changes in the same weeks also move these numbers. A status is about your own change, not about any regulation. This is a measurement for the rule owner, not an audit of your change process.

Changes not linked to our recommendations

None.

Overlaps between rules

Rules that never fired

No rule catalogue was given. A rule that never fired is not in the rule-hit log, so it cannot be listed. Inputs unknown.

Proposals

No written effectiveness threshold was given. The retire line is the fraud rate of all payments with a known outcome.

Effects are backtests on past data, not forecasts.

Add a rule for: Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow

Reference REC-16a49a98. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: lowPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, mcc, operation_type.
  • No rule catalogue was given, so we cannot see whether a rule covers it.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.

Caveats

  • Selective labels: 95 alerts were on declined payments. Their outcome is unknown, so they are left out of precision and of fraud caught.
  • Label maturity: 140 alerts are newer than the 14-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 3 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S07 (Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S07 (Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow)

Add a rule for: Large loans are taken and repaid again and again

Reference REC-fc5701c9. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: lowPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, operation_type, amount.
  • No rule catalogue was given, so we cannot see whether a rule covers it.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.

Caveats

  • Selective labels: 95 alerts were on declined payments. Their outcome is unknown, so they are left out of precision and of fraud caught.
  • Label maturity: 140 alerts are newer than the 14-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 3 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S05 (Large loans are taken and repaid again and again) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S05 (Large loans are taken and repaid again and again)

Add a rule for: One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity

Reference REC-5ff2bbff. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: lowPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: customer_id, operation_type, amount.
  • No rule catalogue was given, so we cannot see whether a rule covers it.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.

Caveats

  • Selective labels: 95 alerts were on declined payments. Their outcome is unknown, so they are left out of precision and of fraud caught.
  • Label maturity: 140 alerts are newer than the 14-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 3 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S02 (One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S02 (One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity)

Add a rule for: Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code

Reference REC-8078ec06. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: mediumPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: mcc, payment_purpose.
  • No rule catalogue was given, so we cannot see whether a rule covers it.
  • It cannot be covered on this data: the transactions file has no category-code or no payment-purpose column (see UA-NBU51-01 (The acquirer passes payee (merchant) name and category code to the issuer. Check that these fields are filled in your data. Most time-relevant item: the deadline is about 20.11.2026)).
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.

Caveats

  • Selective labels: 95 alerts were on declined payments. Their outcome is unknown, so they are left out of precision and of fraud caught.
  • Label maturity: 140 alerts are newer than the 14-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 3 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S11 (Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S11 (Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code)
  • UA-NBU51-01 (The acquirer passes payee (merchant) name and category code to the issuer. Check that these fields are filled in your data. Most time-relevant item: the deadline is about 20.11.2026)

Add a rule for: Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity

Reference REC-05f946b2. Quote this reference in your change record.

Add a missing fraud typeConfidence: lowPriority: 50.0

Rules: none.

Expected effect: no effect estimate for this proposal.

Evidence

  • Needs these data fields: account_type, counterparty_id, ts, amount.
  • No rule catalogue was given, so we cannot see whether a rule covers it.
  • Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.

Caveats

  • Selective labels: 95 alerts were on declined payments. Their outcome is unknown, so they are left out of precision and of fraud caught.
  • Label maturity: 140 alerts are newer than the 14-day label delay. They are not counted as false alarms.
  • Short history: the data covers 3 calendar month(s). Trends need at least 6.
  • Synthetic data: the transactions, labels and unit costs are demo values, not a client's data.
  • UA-NBU-S08 (Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity) is a sign from an NBU draft resolution. It is a draft, not law.
Sources:
  • UA-NBU-S08 (Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity)

Your imported rules

You gave your rule definitions with a consent line from Demo: synthetic data, no real client, dated 2026-11-12. Engine: demo engine (synthetic). The collector replayed each rule on your transactions inside your environment and compared the replay with your engine's hit log, rule ID by rule ID. The replay never replaces a logged number: every number in the other sections comes from your hit log. The replay keeps and uses only the columns your rule file names, and it never opens the labels file.

Agreement = transactions where both fired, divided by transactions where either fired. A what-if needs an agreement of at least 0.95 and at least 10 hits on either side. Rows in a windowed rule's first window are left out (warm-up): the replay has no history from before your file starts. An empty cell makes a check false and is counted.

Format of the rule file: Download an example rule file (JSON, with a note on every key; replace its example consent line before you use it).

Agreement with your engine's log

Your ruleActionLogged hitsReplay hitsBothLogged onlyReplay onlyAgreementStatusRows left out (warm-up)Rows with empty cellsUnreadable values
Single transfer above 9000 tp_u21_large_txn_9k (agreement with your engine's log: 88%)review80908001088%Below the agreement floor000
Transfer above 500 tp_u21_transfer_over_500 (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)review70170170100100%Agrees000
One sender pays five or more receivers in five days tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)alert25252500100%Agrees15200
More than two wires from one sender in a week tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)review22222200100%Agrees208810
Wire total from one sender in a week tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)decline89898900100%Agrees208810
Five or more senders pay one account in five days tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)review24242400100%Agrees15200
Device risk score from the vendor R-509 (agreement: not replayable)review0—————Not replayable———
One device used by several customers R-610 (agreement: not replayable)alert0—————Not replayable———
Very large transfer after a quiet spell R-900 (agreement: cannot be compared)review0450045—Cannot be compared000

Differences to check

Up to five of your own transaction IDs per kind, so you can find the translation error. They stay in this internal report.

Not replayable

What-if on past data

Wire total from one sender in a week tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%, measured at your current threshold)

Check #2: the total amount with the same sender id in 7 days is more than 4999, counting only transactions where channel is "wire". Your engine's log has 89 hits for this rule after the warm-up; the replay at your current threshold is the base of every change below.

ThresholdHits (this rule)Caught (this rule)False alarms (this rule)Not yet mature (this rule)Outcome unknown (this rule)Alerts, all rulesFalse-alarm cost change vs your current threshold (estimate, USD)
your current threshold89001574662—
600070 (-19)0 (0)0 (0)8 (-7)62 (-12)662 (0)5.60 USD
800037 (-52)0 (0)0 (0)5 (-10)32 (-42)660 (-2)12.00 USD

Hits, caught, false alarms, not yet mature and outcome unknown count this rule's own hits. "Alerts, all rules" counts every payment any of your rules alerted on, once: a payment another rule alerts anyway does not change it. The cost change prices the alerted good payments of all rules together, as the false-alarm cost in the rest of this report does: analyst time when the payment was not declined, your friction cost when it was, never both. A rule that declines payments declines its hits.

  • 6000: Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised the same number of alerts and caught the same fraud cases. Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised the same number of false alarms, and the false-alarm cost would have been 5.60 USD higher (an estimate from your unit costs). On your history, this rule alone would have raised 19 fewer alerts; your other rules alerted on those payments anyway, so the total does not change. This rule declines the payments it hits, so a changed threshold can raise the false-alarm cost. On your history, 7 good payments that this rule declined would not have been declined at this threshold; your other rules alerted on them anyway, so each would have cost analyst time (4.80 USD) instead of your friction cost (4.00 USD).
  • 8000: Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised 2 fewer alerts and caught the same fraud cases. Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised the same number of false alarms, and the false-alarm cost would have been 12.00 USD higher (an estimate from your unit costs). On your history, this rule alone would have raised 52 fewer alerts; your other rules alerted on 50 of those payments anyway. This rule declines the payments it hits, so a changed threshold can raise the false-alarm cost. On your history, 20 good payments that this rule declined would not have been declined at this threshold; your other rules alerted on them anyway, so each would have cost analyst time (4.80 USD) instead of your friction cost (4.00 USD). On your history, 1 good payment that only this rule alerted on would not have been alerted on at this threshold, so it would have cost nothing instead of your friction cost (4.00 USD).

Backtest on past data, not a forecast. A changed threshold can change how fraudsters behave.

A payment that was declined has no outcome. Hits on declined payments are counted as 'outcome unknown', not as caught or as false alarms. A rule that declines payments hides the fraud it stopped, so 'caught' can be lower than the real number.

This collector changes no live rule. A threshold change goes through your own change and approval process.

Transfer above 500 tp_u21_transfer_over_500 (agreement with your engine's log: 100%, measured at your current threshold)

Check #1: amount is more than 500. Your engine's log has 701 hits for this rule after the warm-up; the replay at your current threshold is the base of every change below.

ThresholdHits (this rule)Caught (this rule)False alarms (this rule)Not yet mature (this rule)Outcome unknown (this rule)Alerts, all rulesFalse-alarm cost change vs your current threshold (estimate, USD)
your current threshold7014144313871723—
1000653 (-48)34 (-7)410 (-33)131 (-7)70 (-1)684 (-39)-158.40 USD
2000537 (-164)20 (-21)344 (-99)104 (-34)62 (-9)602 (-121)-456.00 USD

Hits, caught, false alarms, not yet mature and outcome unknown count this rule's own hits. "Alerts, all rules" counts every payment any of your rules alerted on, once: a payment another rule alerts anyway does not change it. The cost change prices the alerted good payments of all rules together, as the false-alarm cost in the rest of this report does: analyst time when the payment was not declined, your friction cost when it was, never both. A rule that declines payments declines its hits.

  • 1000: Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised 39 fewer alerts and caught the same fraud cases. Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised 33 fewer false alarms, and the false-alarm cost would have been 158.40 USD lower (an estimate from your unit costs). On your history, this rule alone would have raised 48 fewer alerts, 33 of them false alarms, 7 of them caught fraud cases; your other rules alerted on 9 of those payments anyway.
  • 2000: Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised 121 fewer alerts and caught the same fraud cases. Across all your rules, on your history this threshold would have raised 95 fewer false alarms, and the false-alarm cost would have been 456.00 USD lower (an estimate from your unit costs). On your history, this rule alone would have raised 164 fewer alerts, 99 of them false alarms, 21 of them caught fraud cases; your other rules alerted on 43 of those payments anyway.

Backtest on past data, not a forecast. A changed threshold can change how fraudsters behave.

A payment that was declined has no outcome. Hits on declined payments are counted as 'outcome unknown', not as caught or as false alarms. A rule that declines payments hides the fraud it stopped, so 'caught' can be lower than the real number.

This collector changes no live rule. A threshold change goes through your own change and approval process.

Single transfer above 9000 tp_u21_large_txn_9k (agreement with your engine's log: 88%, measured at your current threshold)

What-if refused for Single transfer above 9000: its replay is below the agreement floor, so a what-if would carry the translation error.

Side by side with WoWyrd rules

Each of your rules next to the WoWyrd rule for the same fraud type and the requirement it relates to. A link found by the rule's name says "please check".

Your ruleFraud type and WoWyrd ruleRequirement it relates to
Single transfer above 9000 tp_u21_large_txn_9k (agreement with your engine's log: 88%)
Trigger: amount is at least 9000. Action: review. Logged hits: 80. Replay: Below the agreement floor.
No fraud type in our library matches this rule. Add a typology ID to the rule file.No requirement in our library relates to this rule.
Transfer above 500 tp_u21_transfer_over_500 (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)
Trigger: amount is more than 500. Action: review. Logged hits: 701. Replay: Agrees.
No fraud type in our library matches this rule. Add a typology ID to the rule file.No requirement in our library relates to this rule.
One sender pays five or more receivers in five days tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)
Trigger: the number of different receiver id values with the same sender id in 5 days is at least 5. Action: alert. Logged hits: 25. Replay: Agrees.
One payer sends to far more payees than similar payers UA-NBU-S15
WoWyrd rule available: One account pays many different payees account_many_payees; numbers: not run on your data
UA-NBU-S15 One payer sends to far more payees than similar payers: NBU draft, Annex 2 sign. Status: draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law); as of 2026-11-11. bank.gov.ua
More than two wires from one sender in a week tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)
Trigger: channel is "wire" and the number of transactions with the same sender id in 7 days is more than 2, counting only transactions where channel is "wire". Action: review. Logged hits: 22. Replay: Agrees.
Many operations of one type in a short time, incoming or outgoing UA-NBU-S03
WoWyrd rule available: Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h; A burst of operations of one type same_operation_type_burst; numbers: not run on your data
UA-NBU-S03 Many operations of one type in a short time, incoming or outgoing: NBU draft, Annex 2 sign. Status: draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law); as of 2026-11-11. bank.gov.ua
Wire total from one sender in a week tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)
Trigger: channel is "wire" and the total amount with the same sender id in 7 days is more than 4999, counting only transactions where channel is "wire". Action: decline. Logged hits: 95. Replay: Agrees.
No fraud type in our library matches this rule. Add a typology ID to the rule file.No requirement in our library relates to this rule.
Five or more senders pay one account in five days tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d (agreement with your engine's log: 100%)
Trigger: the number of different sender id values with the same receiver id in 5 days is at least 5. Action: review. Logged hits: 24. Replay: Agrees.
matched by name: please check
Many operations of one type in a short time, incoming or outgoing UA-NBU-S03
WoWyrd rule available: Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h; A burst of operations of one type same_operation_type_burst; numbers: not run on your data
Many payers send to one payee, far more than for similar payees UA-NBU-S16
WoWyrd rule available: Many senders pay one account inbound_sender_fan_in; One payee shared by several customers beneficiary_reuse; numbers: not run on your data
Many different senders pay one account within a short time OR-01
WoWyrd rule available: Many senders pay one account inbound_sender_fan_in; numbers: not run on your data
matched by name: please check
UA-NBU-S03 Many operations of one type in a short time, incoming or outgoing: NBU draft, Annex 2 sign. Status: draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law); as of 2026-11-11. bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-S16 Many payers send to one payee, far more than for similar payees: NBU draft, Annex 2 sign. Status: draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law); as of 2026-11-11. bank.gov.ua
UA-16013-01 Passing cards, account access or payment data to fraudsters becomes a crime. Detect and restrict accounts used as drops. Status: adopted by the Rada 28.10.2026; presidential signature not confirmed; as of 2026-11-11. itd.rada.gov.ua
FinCEN advisories and alerts (money-mule red flags). Status: public red-flag references; own wording; as of 2026-11-11. No official page confirmed
FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F (red flags). Status: public red-flag references; own wording; as of 2026-11-11. No official page confirmed
Unit21 recommended rules (2024 public copies). Status: public red-flag references; own wording; as of 2026-11-11. No official page confirmed
EU-PSR-04 Monitor both outgoing and incoming payments for fraud. Status: agreed, not adopted (EU Payment Services Regulation; adoption expected by 12.2026); as of 2026-11-11. oeil.europarl.europa.eu
UK-PSR-01 Sending and receiving providers share APP scam refunds; a claim has a maximum level. Status: in force since 07.10.2024; as of 2026-11-11. psr.org.uk
UK-FCA-01 Monitor incoming as well as outgoing payments, with money-mule signs. Status: consultation; comments close 24.12.2026; as of 2026-11-11. fca.org.uk
US-NACHA-02 Receiving banks monitor incoming credits, including new, dormant and mule accounts. Status: in force: phase 1 20.03.2026, phase 2 22.06.2026; as of 2026-11-11. nacha.org
Device risk score from the vendor R-509 (agreement: not replayable)
Trigger: not expressible in the rule file. Action: review. Logged hits: 0. Replay: Not replayable.
matched by name: please check
One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users UA-NBU-S13
WoWyrd rule available: One device used by several customers multi_account_device; numbers: not run on your data
matched by name: please check
UA-NBU-S13 One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users: NBU draft, Annex 2 sign. Status: draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law); as of 2026-11-11. bank.gov.ua
One device used by several customers R-610 (agreement: not replayable)
Trigger: the number of different sender id values with the same device id in 1 day is at least 3. Action: alert. Logged hits: 0. Replay: Not replayable.
One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users UA-NBU-S13
WoWyrd rule available: One device used by several customers multi_account_device; numbers: not run on your data
UA-NBU-S13 One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users: NBU draft, Annex 2 sign. Status: draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law); as of 2026-11-11. bank.gov.ua
Very large transfer after a quiet spell R-900 (agreement: cannot be compared)
Trigger: amount is more than 20000. Action: review. Logged hits: 0. Replay: Cannot be compared.
A dormant account suddenly moves large amounts OR-04
WoWyrd rule: planned
FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F (red flags). Status: public red-flag references; own wording; as of 2026-11-11. No official page confirmed
UK-FCA-01 Monitor incoming as well as outgoing payments, with money-mule signs. Status: consultation; comments close 24.12.2026; as of 2026-11-11. fca.org.uk
US-FFIEC-AF-06 Large amounts soon after opening; a dormant account suddenly active. Status: guidance; as of 2026-11-11. bsaaml.ffiec.gov
US-NACHA-02 Receiving banks monitor incoming credits, including new, dormant and mule accounts. Status: in force: phase 1 20.03.2026, phase 2 22.06.2026; as of 2026-11-11. nacha.org

Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.

Below-the-line sample (AML rules)

AML rules have no labels below the threshold: nobody reviews a payment the rule did not flag. For each number threshold of a rule marked aml, the collector picked up to 20 payments in each of 3 bands just under the line (each band 10% of the threshold). Your analysts review them in btl-sample.csv: write suspicious or not_suspicious in analyst_label. The next run reads the file with --btl-labels and shows the share marked suspicious. The file holds transaction IDs: it stays inside your environment and is never in the summary. The order is fixed by your token key and the seed "wowyrd-btl", so a re-run gives the same list. Nothing here changes a score.

RuleCheckBandPayments in bandSampledSuspiciousSuspicious share
tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5dthe number of different receiver id values with the same sender id in 5 days is at least 5from 4 below 541200 of 170.0%
tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5dthe number of different receiver id values with the same sender id in 5 days is at least 5from 3 below 4141202 of 2010.0%
tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5dthe number of different receiver id values with the same sender id in 5 days is at least 5from 2 below 3537200 of 200.0%
tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7dthe number of transactions with the same sender id in 7 days is more than 2, counting only transactions where channel is "wire"more than 1 up to 25620——
tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dthe number of different sender id values with the same receiver id in 5 days is at least 5from 4 below 515151 of 616.7%
tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dthe number of different sender id values with the same receiver id in 5 days is at least 5from 3 below 496204 of 2020.0%
tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5dthe number of different sender id values with the same receiver id in 5 days is at least 5from 2 below 3451201 of 205.0%

Of the reviewed payments just under this threshold, this share was marked suspicious by your analysts. A high share means the threshold may be too high. It is not projected to all payments.

Not sampled

Coverage by fraud type

Fraud types present in your labels

Fraud types present in your labelsOne out to many (fan-out): 13 caught, 0 missed; Many into one (fan-in): 11 caught, 1 missed; Type not given: 58 caught, 20 missedOne out to many (fan-out)One out to many (fan-out)One out to many (fan-out): 13 caught13 caught, 0 missedMany into one (fan-in)Many into one (fan-in)Many into one (fan-in): 11 caughtMany into one (fan-in): 1 missed11 caught, 1 missedType not givenType not givenType not given: 58 caughtType not given: 20 missed58 caught, 20 missed
Labelled fraud cases per type. Blue: a rule fired on the payment. Orange: no rule fired. Source: labels file and rule-hit log, labels known by the cut-off.
Fraud typeLabelled casesCaughtMissedLibrary types it matchesYour rules' coverageWoWyrd
One out to many (fan-out)13130One payer sends to far more payees than similar payers (UA-NBU-S15), One account pays many new beneficiaries (OR-07)CoveredWoWyrd rule available: One account pays many different payees account_many_payees
Many into one (fan-in)12111Many payers send to one payee, far more than for similar payees (UA-NBU-S16), Many different senders pay one account within a short time (OR-01)CoveredWoWyrd rule available: Many senders pay one account inbound_sender_fan_in; One payee shared by several customers beneficiary_reuse
Type not given785820noneUnknownWoWyrd rule: planned

Not in this dataset, so it cannot be measured here

Your labels hold no case of these types, so this data cannot show whether your rules catch them. This is not a gap in your rules. The rules column lists catalogue rules whose names match the type.

Library typeIDYour rules whose names matchSourcesWoWyrd
One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar usersUA-NBU-S01noneUA-NBU-S01WoWyrd rule: planned
One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activityUA-NBU-S02noneUA-NBU-S02WoWyrd rule available: One type of operation dominates an account operation_type_concentration
Many operations of one type in a short time, incoming or outgoingUA-NBU-S03noneUA-NBU-S03WoWyrd rule available: Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h; A burst of operations of one type same_operation_type_burst
Balance stays low although large amounts pass throughUA-NBU-S04noneUA-NBU-S04WoWyrd rule available: Large amounts pass through an account that keeps a low balance low_balance_high_turnover
Large loans are taken and repaid again and againUA-NBU-S05noneUA-NBU-S05WoWyrd rule available: Large loans taken and repaid again and again loan_issue_repayment_churn
Money comes in and leaves fast, little balance staysUA-NBU-S06noneUA-NBU-S06WoWyrd rule available: Money leaves soon after it arrives rapid_pass_through
Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers followUA-NBU-S07noneUA-NBU-S07WoWyrd rule available: Gambling winnings with no gambling deposits gambling_winnings_without_deposits
Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activityUA-NBU-S08noneUA-NBU-S08WoWyrd rule available: A personal account paid by many payers personal_account_business_activity
A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closesUA-NBU-S09noneUA-NBU-S09WoWyrd rule available: A merchant with little history suddenly busy low_history_merchant_spike
Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit)UA-NBU-S10noneUA-NBU-S10WoWyrd rule available: A business account pays out almost all it receives business_account_transit
Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category codeUA-NBU-S11noneUA-NBU-S11WoWyrd rule available: Payment purpose does not fit the merchant's business payment_purpose_atypical_for_mcc; Card payment to a person without category or purpose acquiring_to_person_missing_data
Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change oftenUA-NBU-S12noneUA-NBU-S12WoWyrd rule available: Payout right after an email or phone change contact_change_to_payout; One session from several network addresses session_multiple_ips; One account used from many devices account_many_devices
One device fingerprint is used by unrelated usersUA-NBU-S13noneUA-NBU-S13WoWyrd rule available: One device used by several customers multi_account_device
Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the timeUA-NBU-S14noneUA-NBU-S14WoWyrd rule available: Locations too far apart for the time between them impossible_travel
Most of an incoming amount leaves again within hoursOR-02noneFINCEN, EUROPOL-EMMA, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule available: Money leaves soon after it arrives rapid_pass_through
A new account gets large or many credits soon after openingOR-03noneUNIT21, UK-FINANCEWoWyrd rule available: A new account receives a large credit new_account_large_incoming_credit; A new account paid by several people new_account_inbound_fan_in
A dormant account suddenly moves large amountsOR-04noneFFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule: planned
Repeated amounts just under a reporting or limit thresholdOR-05noneFFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule available: Payments just under a limit just_below_threshold_payment; Many small payments from one account add up to a large sum amount_structuring_account; Many small payments to one payee add up to a large sum amount_structuring_beneficiary
Repeated round amounts with no business reasonOR-06noneFFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule available: Several payments in large round amounts repeated_round_amounts
Outgoing payments per hour above the customer's usual levelOR-08noneUNIT21, EBA-GL-2021-02WoWyrd rule available: More payments in an hour than the customer usually makes high_customer_velocity_1h; Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h
A large first payment to a payee never paid beforeOR-09noneUK-FINANCE, UK-PSRWoWyrd rule available: A large payment to a payee added just before new_payee_high_amount
Many senders' accounts share one beneficiaryOR-10noneWOWYRD-SPIKE, FINCENWoWyrd rule available: One payee shared by several customers beneficiary_reuse
Money goes round in a circle between accounts within daysOR-11noneFATF-REF, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule: planned
An amount far above the customer's own historyOR-12noneEBA-GL-2021-02, NBU-DRAFTWoWyrd rule available: A payment far above the customer's usual amount amount_far_above_customer_average
Many small credits, then one large debitOR-13noneEUROPOL-EMMA, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule available: Many small credits, then one large payout many_small_credits_then_large_payout
Credits from many different banks into one accountOR-14noneFIU-UA, FINCENWoWyrd rule available: Credits from many different banks into one account inbound_from_many_banks
Transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictionsOR-15noneFATF-REF, FFIEC-APPFWoWyrd rule available: A payment to or from a high-risk country high_risk_jurisdiction_counterparty
Cash withdrawn right after a credit arrivesOR-16noneFINCEN, FIU-UAWoWyrd rule available: Cash taken out soon after money arrives cash_withdrawal_after_credit
The payee name does not match and the payment still goesOR-17noneUK-PSR, EU-PSRWoWyrd rule available: Paid although the payee name did not match payee_name_mismatch_paid
The payment reference mentions investment, crypto or a 'safe account'OR-18noneUK-FINANCEWoWyrd rule available: The payment reference uses common scam wording payment_reference_scam_wording
An older customer suddenly sends a large amount to a new payeeOR-19noneFINCENWoWyrd rule available: An older customer sends a large amount to a new payee older_customer_new_payee_large
Activity at hours unusual for the customerOR-20noneNBU-DRAFTWoWyrd rule available: Activity at an hour unusual for the customer unusual_hour_for_customer

New in our reference set since your last report

Our reference set: version v0.7.0, published 2026-11-18 (built into this collector).

Our reference set has not changed since your last report (version v0.7.0).

Incoming payments and money-mule signs

Incoming payments not measured: your transactions file has no direction column (for example direction, with values such as in and out).

Requirements changed since the last review

Your rules are mapped to current requirements. We flag when a new requirement affects them. We follow official publications of regulators in Ukraine, the EU, the UK and the US.

Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.

Requirements library read on 2026-11-11. No change file was given for this run, so no changed requirement is listed here.

Requirements still open since the previous report

Your rules may not cover requirement UA-NBU-01, “Review every rule at least monthly by back-testing it”

Review every rule at least monthly by back-testing it. (NBU draft §16(10), §65-66, status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Gap), and it is still open. Now: Partly met.

The data covers 3 calendar month(s), 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01. A monthly back-test needs one run per month; a trend needs 6 months. This run splits the data by month into 3 periods.

We found no implementation guidance from the regulator for this requirement.

Public cases where a regulator named the same kind of gap (monitoring rules, scenarios or thresholds not reviewed, tested or tuned):

Your rules may not cover requirement UA-NBU-02, “Metric 1: compare how often each rule fired with how many payments were actually stopped”

Metric 1: compare how often each rule fired with how many payments were actually stopped. (NBU draft §60(1), status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Partly met), and it is still open. Now: Partly met.

Measured: 22.3%; no written threshold to compare against (§62). 6 rules fired 947 times; 211 of those hits were on stopped payments (22.3%). The per-rule table is in the technical report.

We found no implementation guidance from the regulator for this requirement.

Public cases where a regulator named the same kind of gap (transaction monitoring not effective or not calibrated to the firm's risks):

Your rules may not cover requirement UA-NBU-03, “Metric 2: share of fraud value that was prevented, out of all fraud value”

Metric 2: share of fraud value that was prevented, out of all fraud value. (NBU draft §60(2), status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Partly met), and it is still open. Now: Partly met.

Measured: 37.2%; no written threshold to compare against (§62). Fraud value stopped: 37.2% (239,475.00 of 643,715.00 USD). Fraud value with any alert: 99.2% (638,657.25 USD). Whether reviewed alerts were stopped is not in the decision log.

We found no implementation guidance from the regulator for this requirement.

Public cases where a regulator named the same kind of gap (transaction monitoring not effective or not calibrated to the firm's risks):

Your rules may not cover requirement UA-NBU-04, “Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review”

Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review. (NBU draft §62-64, status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Gap), and it is still open. Now: Gap.

No written effectiveness threshold was given. As a pointer: 0 of 2 rules with at least 30 alerts with a known outcome catch fraud at or under the base fraud rate of 4.7%.

We found no implementation guidance from the regulator for this requirement.

Public cases where a regulator named the same kind of gap (monitoring rules, scenarios or thresholds not reviewed, tested or tuned; transaction monitoring not effective or not calibrated to the firm's risks):

Your rules may not cover requirement UA-NBU-05, “Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel”

Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel. (NBU draft §68-69, status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Partly met), and it is still open. Now: Partly met.

No recorded decisions in your files. Recommended decisions: cancel 0, adjust 0, keep 2. 4 rules have fewer than 30 alerts with a known outcome, so no decision is recommended. The decision itself is yours to record.

We found no implementation guidance from the regulator for this requirement.

Public cases where a regulator named the same kind of gap (monitoring rules, scenarios or thresholds not reviewed, tested or tuned):

Your rules may not cover requirement UA-NBU-09, “Reconcile payment operations every day”

Reconcile payment operations every day. (NBU draft §16, §18, §2, status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Partly met), and it is still open. Now: Partly met.

Days reviewed: 60 (2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01; UTC days). Days with no payments: 0. Payments with no row in the rule-hit log: 0. Rule-hit rows with no payment: 0. No ledger was given, so amounts were not reconciled. Give your settlement or ledger export with --ledger to reconcile them. This checks your exports. Whether your staff reconcile every day is a process question: answer it in the assessment checklist.

We found no implementation guidance from the regulator for this requirement.

We found no public enforcement case for this kind of gap.

Your rules may not cover requirement UA-NBU-11, “Have evidence ready for a supervisor: documents, rules, risk markers”

Have evidence ready for a supervisor: documents, rules, risk markers. (NBU draft §19, status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Partly met), and it is still open. Now: Partly met.

This report maps each finding to a requirement ID and its status (20 requirements). Your written rules, risk markers and staff interviews stay with you.

We found no implementation guidance from the regulator for this requirement.

Public cases where a regulator named the same kind of gap (monitoring rules, scenarios or thresholds not reviewed, tested or tuned; transaction monitoring not effective or not calibrated to the firm's risks):

Your rules may not cover requirement US-NYDFS-01, “Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis”

Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis. (3 NYCRR 504.3, status as of 2026-11-11). The previous report (data up to 2026-08-27) found it too (Partly met), and it is still open. Now: Partly met.

This run analyses 6 rules over 3 periods by month (3 calendar month(s)). Ongoing analysis means running it every month.

How the regulator describes doing this:

Public cases where a regulator named the same kind of gap (monitoring rules, scenarios or thresholds not reviewed, tested or tuned):

Resolved since the previous report

Not legal advice. Your compliance team decides how a requirement applies to you. Public cases show how regulators have treated the same kind of gap; they do not predict an outcome for you.

Regulatory checks by regulator

Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.

Regulatory statuses as of 2026-11-11 (library date). Check them again before you rely on this report.

Checks are grouped by the regulator that sets the requirement. Each row gives the requirement ID, our own short wording of it, the result on your files, and the source's status on the date shown. Our wording is a summary, not the regulator's text.

Checks per NBU requirements

Rows citing the NBU draft of 17.07.2026 — draft, not in force: its text can change before adoption. Resolutions 51, 54 and 116 are in force. Bill 16013 is a Ukrainian bill, shown here with its status.

Requirement IDNBU draft paragraphOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
UA-NBU51-01—The acquirer passes payee (merchant) name and category code to the issuer. Check that these fields are filled in your data. Most time-relevant item: the deadline is about 20.11.2026.Not measurable from these filesYour transactions file has no payee-name or category-code column. Add them to the export so this can be measured. Without them no rule can check payment purpose against category code.Transactions file: 1,950 rows; columns checked: payee_name, merchant_name, recipient_name, receiver_name, beneficiary_name, mcc, merchant_category_code.in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-01§66Review every rule at least monthly by back-testing it. (NBU draft §66; library item UA-NBU-01.)Partly metThe data covers 3 calendar month(s), 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01. A monthly back-test needs one run per month; a trend needs 6 months. This run splits the data by month into 3 periods.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-02§60Metric 1: compare how often each rule fired with how many payments were actually stopped. (NBU draft §60(1); library item UA-NBU-02.)Partly metMeasured: 22.3%; no written threshold to compare against (§62). 6 rules fired 947 times; 211 of those hits were on stopped payments (22.3%). The per-rule table is in the technical report.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days. First rules: tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d 24 hits, 0 stopped; tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d 25 hits, 1 stopped; tp_u21_large_txn_9k 80 hits, 12 stopped; tp_u21_transfer_over_500 701 hits, 85 stopped; tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d 22 hits, 18 stopped; tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d 95 hits, 95 stopped.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-03§60Metric 2: share of fraud value that was prevented, out of all fraud value. (NBU draft §60(2); library item UA-NBU-03.)Partly metMeasured: 37.2%; no written threshold to compare against (§62). Fraud value stopped: 37.2% (239,475.00 of 643,715.00 USD). Fraud value with any alert: 99.2% (638,657.25 USD). Whether reviewed alerts were stopped is not in the decision log.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days. 103 payments labelled fraud.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-04§62Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review. (NBU draft §62; library item UA-NBU-04.)GapNo written effectiveness threshold was given. As a pointer: 0 of 2 rules with at least 30 alerts with a known outcome catch fraud at or under the base fraud rate of 4.7%.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-05§68–69Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel. (NBU draft §68–69; library item UA-NBU-05.)Partly metNo recorded decisions in your files. Recommended decisions: cancel 0, adjust 0, keep 2. 4 rules have fewer than 30 alerts with a known outcome, so no decision is recommended. The decision itself is yours to record.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-11—Have evidence ready for a supervisor: documents, rules, risk markers.Partly metThis report maps each finding to a requirement ID and its status (20 requirements). Your written rules, risk markers and staff interviews stay with you.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU51-02—Show the acquirer's full name before an online payment; receipts show payee, commission, purpose and category code.Not measurable from these filesYour transactions file has no receipt column for the 1,220 acquiring payments (a card channel). Add the category code, payee name, payment purpose and commission to the export so this can be measured. This checks the data in your export, not your payment page or your receipts. Showing the acquirer's full name before an online payment stays a checklist question.Transactions file; columns looked for: mcc, merchant_category_code, payee_name, merchant_name, recipient_name, receiver_name, beneficiary_name, payment_purpose, purpose, purpose_category, payment_reference, reference, narrative, commission, commission_amount, fee, fee_amount.in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU-09—Reconcile payment operations every day.Partly metDays reviewed: 60 (2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01; UTC days). Days with no payments: 0. Payments with no row in the rule-hit log: 0. Rule-hit rows with no payment: 0. No ledger was given, so amounts were not reconciled. Give your settlement or ledger export with --ledger to reconcile them. This checks your exports. Whether your staff reconcile every day is a process question: answer it in the assessment checklist.Transactions file and rule-hit log, by UTC day.draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU51-03—Acquiring for natural persons only for allowed categories, with the required data passed to the issuer.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU54-01—Non-bank providers that acquire payments need an authorisation; the sanctions pause has ended.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force; grace period ended 02.09.20262026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU116-01—Remote verification of natural persons uses the updated procedure with credit-bureau data.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force since 10.10.2026; 3 months to align internal procedures (about 10.01.2027)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-NBU116-02—Reports to the State Financial Monitoring Service go only through the e-cabinet, with numbered registers.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force since 10.10.2026; 3 months to align internal procedures (about 10.01.2027)2026-11-11bank.gov.ua
UA-16013-01—Passing cards, account access or payment data to fraudsters becomes a crime. Detect and restrict accounts used as drops.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.adopted by the Rada 28.10.2026; presidential signature not confirmed2026-11-11itd.rada.gov.ua

Checks per EU requirements

Requirement IDOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
EU-PSR-05When a payee name check fails because of the payee's provider, that provider compensates the payer's provider. Keep evidence of the name check on received transfers.Not measurable from these filesYour transactions file has no payee name-check result. Add it to measure received transfers with a name mismatch or no check.Columns looked for: name_check_result, payee_check_result, cop_result, vop_result, name_check.agreed, not adopted (EU Payment Services Regulation; adoption expected by 12.2026)2026-11-11oeil.europarl.europa.eu

Checks per UK requirements

Requirement IDOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
UK-PSR-03A claim may carry an excess of up to 100 GBP, never for vulnerable customers.Not measurable from these filesChecklist question. The files do not show this.Answer in the assessment checklist.in force2026-11-11psr.org.uk
UK-FCA-02Test and review rules; a poorly calibrated rule set the firm cannot explain is poor practice.No gap found in your data0 rules or thresholds look poorly calibrated on your data (none); 0 catalogue rules never fired. Every proposal gives a plain-word reason.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.guidance in force2026-11-11fca.org.uk

Checks per US requirements (FinCEN, NYDFS, FFIEC, Nacha, Federal Reserve)

FinCEN and Nacha items are not checked from your files in this run; the rows below are NYDFS and FFIEC items.

Requirement IDOur wordingResultFindingEvidenceSource statusAs ofOfficial source
US-NYDFS-01Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis.Partly metThis run analyses 6 rules over 3 periods by month (3 calendar month(s)). Ongoing analysis means running it every month.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.in force2026-11-11dfs.ny.gov
US-NYDFS-02Test rules before and after they go live.Not measurable from these filesThe files do not show when each rule went live, so before-and-after tests cannot be checked. A replay of a new rule on past data can serve as the test before go-live.Rule catalogue has no go-live date.in force2026-11-11dfs.ny.gov
US-FFIEC-01Tune and validate monitoring; justify each threshold.No gap found in your data0 tuning proposals (none). Each states its evidence on past data.Source: your decision log and fraud labels, 2026-08-03 to 2026-10-01, labels known by 2026-10-01, label delay 14 days.guidance2026-11-11bsaaml.ffiec.gov

Other checks

No other checks in this run.

Run record

The files, code and parameters of this run, so it can be repeated.

ItemValueSource
Input file: costsc16cdd870af20772bbd68af79c07cc73a2f8d124f64c743e1132667ff4b97882SHA-256
Input file: decisions1110cb52381a513a562c9fd1b7c37f694cd1810c754b781153d021a094a03382SHA-256
Input file: labelseded2ebdcc0f80849fefb75cad06bdf5be9afece13ff5772c58f890ec5ac7af6SHA-256
Input file: transactions6a96e6d94f0d00cfd5a51ab22df5abb094b6c661bfae66dcc63f873af1d3212eSHA-256
Collector versionv0.7.0-11-gba7bd7b03d5199dd42d1810a9e4294cde08c03a4git commit
Generation time2026-11-20 10:02 UTCrun time
cutoff2026-10-01T22:21:00+00:00client
label delay days14client
min cell10default
min join coverage0.95default
periodmonthclient
thresholdnot givennot given
tokens for all rulesFalsedefault
Regulatory library2026-11-11statuses as of this date
Requirement change filenot given--changes
Client rule file296c2bb6ecd9cc43c25d19cde0fce613a62000ec94d590eaf74e396b506d1c80SHA-256; 9 rules
Consent lineDemo: synthetic data, no real client, 2026-11-12: Demo file. A made-up client allows the collector to replay these made-up rule definitions on made-up payments.the rule file
Agreement floor0.95default
What-if values triedtp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d: 6000, 8000; tp_u21_transfer_over_500: 1000, 2000; tp_u21_large_txn_9k: 10000--what-if
Tool mapnot given--tools or a tool column in the catalogue
Ledger exportnot given--ledger
Reference set sourcebuilt into this collector
Reference set versionv0.7.0published 2026-11-18
Reference set filee96e792983d3748de554ba3b49a15291c8d4110f1778795555caff0fa81ee119SHA-256
Previous report state5093c9ecc6a39e5c50581f18cd95d93d5f379e1055c8bd7ea0a6d73381c82163SHA-256; --previous
Below-the-line seedwowyrd-btldefault
Below-the-line payments per band20default
Threshold search targetalerts-cap--search-target
Threshold search grid (x current)0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.15, 1.20, 1.30, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00earlier 70% search, later part check
Labelled below-the-line sample47a4bb93725e00723784fdf985cdfd2067dbac544617e6b5023d9cce3e108f3eSHA-256; 103 rows; --btl-labels

Rule glossary

Each rule in this review, in plain words: what it detects, the fraud type it guards against, when it fires, where it comes from, and the data it needs.

tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d Rule ID: tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d

What it detects
No description supplied by the client
Fraud type it guards against
Not stated
When it fires
Not stated
Source
client
Data fields it needs
Unknown

tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d Rule ID: tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d

What it detects
No description supplied by the client
Fraud type it guards against
Not stated
When it fires
Not stated
Source
client
Data fields it needs
Unknown

tp_u21_large_txn_9k Rule ID: tp_u21_large_txn_9k

What it detects
No description supplied by the client
Fraud type it guards against
Not stated
When it fires
Not stated
Source
client
Data fields it needs
Unknown

tp_u21_transfer_over_500 Rule ID: tp_u21_transfer_over_500

What it detects
No description supplied by the client
Fraud type it guards against
Not stated
When it fires
Not stated
Source
client
Data fields it needs
Unknown

tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d

What it detects
No description supplied by the client
Fraud type it guards against
Not stated
When it fires
Not stated
Source
client
Data fields it needs
Unknown

tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d

What it detects
No description supplied by the client
Fraud type it guards against
Not stated
When it fires
Not stated
Source
client
Data fields it needs
Unknown

Fraud types in plain words

Each fraud type named in your labels, in one sentence. The word in small grey text is the label as your file gives it.

Many into one (fan-in) FAN-IN
Many accounts send money into one account, which collects it.
One out to many (fan-out) FAN-OUT
One account sends money out to many accounts, so it spreads thin.
Type not given no type
Fraud labels in your file that do not say which kind of fraud it was.