WoWyrd · Rule review
Rule review: management summary
Client: Demo client (sepa-2026, synthetic). Data: 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-29 (daily periods). Cut-off: 2026-11-29 (set for this run). Generated: 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC.
Internal report. Do not share it outside your firm.
This is the short management report. The extended management report (management-extended.html) and the technical report (technical.html) give the detail.
Outcome
In 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-29, false alarms took 3,515.5 analyst hours and cost 168,992.00 USD. Source: your unit costs and the rule-hit log.
Summed over 3 of the top 3 proposals in this report (each rule counted once), they remove 2 alerts and save 9.60 USD over the same period. They lose 0 caught fraud cases. This is a backtest on past data, not a forecast. The extended report sums its top 5 the same way, so its figure can be larger.
Top 3 proposals
| Proposal | Expected effect (backtest) | Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| REC-f4bb199b Retire rule Many small payments in, then sent out within a day: 2.9% of its 621 alerts with a known outcome were fraud tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h: Finds an account that collects several small payments and passes most of the money on at once. Retire the rule | 1 fewer alerts, 0 caught fraud cases lost, 4.80 USD saved (estimate) | high |
| REC-0bb1e839 Retire rule Money in, then almost all of it sent on within 3 days (layering): 2.1% of its 575 alerts with a known outcome were fraud tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d: Finds an account that receives a large sum and quickly passes nearly all of it to other people. Retire the rule | 0 fewer alerts, 0 caught fraud cases lost, 0.00 USD saved (estimate) | high |
| REC-1d130941 Retire rule 10+ mid-size payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total: 0.5% of its 1,042 alerts with a known outcome were fraud tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d: Finds a burst of many similar mid-size payments that add up to a large total. Retire the rule | 1 fewer alerts, 0 caught fraud cases lost, 4.80 USD saved (estimate) | high |
The top 3 of 26 proposals by priority. Effects come from a backtest on 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-29. Selective labels: a declined payment has no outcome, so fraud a rule stopped by declining is not in "caught fraud cases lost". The extended report lists the top 5; the technical report gives every proposal with its evidence and caveats. Quote the REC-… reference in your change record.
Your tools: what each one adds
Demo: the tool names and the tool map are made up. The rules are the demo's own rules.
| Tool | Alerts | Fraud caught | Only this tool caught | False-alarm cost (estimate) | If this tool were off (backtest) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AML monitoring (example) | 28,122 | 383 | 102 | 91,678.13 USD | 15,577 fewer alerts, 102 caught fraud cases lost, 68,971.20 USD saved (estimate) |
| In-house rules (example) | 19,455 | 1,316 | 759 | 48,552.13 USD | 6,231 fewer alerts, 759 caught fraud cases lost, 23,865.60 USD saved (estimate) |
| Transaction monitoring (example) | 13,775 | 487 | 127 | 28,761.73 USD | 3,615 fewer alerts, 127 caught fraud cases lost, 12,158.40 USD saved (estimate) |
- AML monitoring (example) fired on 70 payments that were declined. Fraud stopped by a decline has no outcome, so this tool's real value may be higher than shown.
- In-house rules (example) fired on 77 payments that were declined. Fraud stopped by a decline has no outcome, so this tool's real value may be higher than shown.
- Transaction monitoring (example) fired on 77 payments that were declined. Fraud stopped by a decline has no outcome, so this tool's real value may be higher than shown.
- Card scheme score (example): no hits in this export. It cannot be measured here.
Backtest on past data, not a forecast. A tool whose score or decision is not in your export cannot be measured here; access to a tool is not use of it. The extended report lists every limit. For internal use. Check your vendor contracts before you share tool-level numbers outside your firm.
New in our reference set since your last report
Our reference set: version v0.7.0, published 2026-11-18 (built into this collector).
Incoming payments and money-mule signs
Your rule log has 91.3% of incoming credits; 7 accounts show a money-mule sign, and a rule fired on 0 of them.
New accounts and onboarding rating
Payments from accounts 30 days old or younger: 41.9% of payments and 40.1% of fraud.
What changed since the previous report
No previous report was given, so this report is treated as the first one. There is nothing to compare with yet. The next run can compare with this one.
Regulatory status by regulator
Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.
Regulatory statuses as of 2026-11-11 (library date). Check them again before you rely on this report.
| Regulator | Source | Status | Results on your files | As of | Official source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ukraine | NBU Resolution No. 51 of 14.05.2026 | in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply | 3 not measurable from these files | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| NBU draft of 17.07.2026 | draft, not in force | 1 gap, 6 partly met | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua | |
| NBU Resolution No. 54 of 27.05.2026 | in force; grace period ended 02.09.2026 | 1 not measurable from these files | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua | |
| NBU Resolution No. 116 of 07.10.2026 | in force since 10.10.2026; 3 months to align internal procedures | 2 not measurable from these files | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua | |
| Bill 16013 | adopted by the Rada 28.10.2026; presidential signature not confirmed | 1 not measurable from these files | 2026-11-11 | itd.rada.gov.ua | |
| EU | EU Payment Services Regulation | agreed, not adopted | 1 not measurable from these files | 2026-11-11 | oeil.europarl.europa.eu |
| UK | UK PSR Specific Direction 20; Financial Ombudsman Service guidance | in force | 1 not measurable from these files | 2026-11-11 | psr.org.uk |
| FCA PS24/17, Financial Crime Guide | guidance in force | 1 partly met | 2026-11-11 | fca.org.uk | |
| US | 3 NYCRR 504.3 | in force | 1 partly met, 1 not measurable from these files | 2026-11-11 | dfs.ny.gov |
| FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, suspicious-activity monitoring | guidance | 1 partly met | 2026-11-11 | bsaaml.ffiec.gov |
Rows citing the NBU draft of 17.07.2026 — draft, not in force: its text can change before adoption. Resolutions 51, 54 and 116 are in force. Bill 16013 is a Ukrainian bill, shown here with its status. Our own short wording, not the regulator's text. The extended report lists each check; the technical report gives each finding and its evidence.
Requirements changed since the last review
Your rules are mapped to current requirements. We flag when a new requirement affects them. We follow official publications of regulators in Ukraine, the EU, the UK and the US.
Requirements library read on 2026-11-11. No change file was given for this run, so no changed requirement is listed here.
Requirements still open since the previous report
Requirements with a gap are followed up once two reports compare and the previous one recorded its findings (see above). Not legal advice.
Where the detail is
- Extended management report (management-extended.html): charts, the top five proposals, coverage by fraud type, each changed requirement and each regulatory check.
- Technical report (technical.html): method, per-rule numbers, every proposal with its evidence and caveats, the run record and the rule glossary.