WoWyrd · Rule review
Rule review: technical report, all business lines
Client: Demo client with 3 business lines (synthetic). Business lines: 3. Generated: 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC.
- Bank transfers: data 2022-09-01 to 2022-09-18 (daily periods), cut-off 2022-09-18, currency USD.
- SEPA transfers: data 2026-10-01 to 2026-11-29 (daily periods), cut-off 2026-11-29, currency USD.
- Mobile money: data 2017-01-01 to 2017-01-31 (daily periods), cut-off 2017-01-31, currency USD.
Internal report. Do not share it outside your firm.
Method
Each business line is measured on its own files, with its own cut-off and label delay, exactly as a single run. This page puts the lines side by side and adds a total.
Totals add counts. A share in the total row is computed again from the added counts, never by averaging the lines' shares. All lines use USD, so amounts are added too.
The summary file stays per business line: each line's folder holds its own summary.json, made by the same code with the same suppression as a single run. No combined summary is written.
No transaction may appear in two lines: the run stops if one does, so no count is added twice.
Totals per business line
| Measure | Bank transfers | SEPA transfers | Mobile money | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Transactions | 58,331 | 59,161 | 54,510 | 172,002 |
| Alerts (transactions with at least one hit) | 53,483 | 42,310 | 54,425 | 150,218 |
| Alerts not yet mature (newer than the label delay) | 143 | 5,523 | 2,674 | 8,340 |
| Alerts on declined payments (no outcome; left out of precision) | 2,129 | 77 | 0 | 2,206 |
| Confirmed fraud (label known by the cut-off) | 967 | 2,078 | 6,153 | 9,198 |
| Confirmed fraud with at least one hit | 928 | 1,570 | 6,126 | 8,624 |
| Evaluable fraud (mature, not declined) | 948 | 2,063 | 6,153 | 9,164 |
| False alarms | 50,302 | 35,155 | 45,625 | 131,082 |
| Declined payments with no fraud or disputed label (friction) | 2,110 | 62 | 0 | 2,172 |
| False-alarm cost (estimate) | 249,889.60 USD | 168,992.00 USD | 219,000.00 USD | 637,881.60 USD |
| Share of fraud with a rule hit | 96.0% | 75.6% | 99.6% | 93.8% |
Rules across business lines
Each cell: hits / precision in that line. A dash: the rule did not fire in that line. The total precision comes from the added caught and false-alarm counts.
| Rule | Bank transfers: hits / precision | SEPA transfers: hits / precision | Mobile money: hits / precision | Total hits | Total caught | Total false alarms | Total precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d Finds one account that collects money from many people, as a collection or mule account does. | 1,588 / 6.4% | 27,376 / 1.2% | 28,140 / 2.4% | 57,104 | 1,057 | 52,693 | 2.0% |
| Large payment on an account less than 30 days old tp_ffiec_new_account_large_30d Finds big money movement on a newly opened account. | — | 119 / 99.0% | — | 119 | 95 | 1 | 99.0% |
| Many small payments in, then sent out within a day tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h Finds an account that collects several small payments and passes most of the money on at once. | 15,845 / 0.5% | 738 / 2.9% | — | 16,583 | 84 | 14,408 | 0.6% |
| Money sent to 5+ different recipients within 5 days (fan-out) tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d Finds one sender spreading money to many receivers in a short time. | 41,258 / 0.5% | 4,461 / 4.0% | — | 45,719 | 362 | 42,600 | 0.8% |
| Spending in the last 3 days doubles the monthly norm tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31d Finds a sender whose recent outgoing volume jumps far above their own usual level. | — | 8,984 / 5.9% | — | 8,984 | 369 | 5,857 | 5.9% |
| Single payment above 9,000 USD tp_u21_large_txn_9k Flags any one large payment for a closer look. | 12,042 / 3.5% | 2,106 / 8.4% | 52,667 / 11.9% | 66,815 | 6,451 | 55,359 | 10.4% |
| Money in, then almost all of it sent on within 3 days (layering) tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d Finds an account that receives a large sum and quickly passes nearly all of it to other people. | 15,502 / 0.9% | 699 / 2.1% | — | 16,201 | 131 | 13,921 | 0.9% |
| 10+ mid-size payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d Finds a burst of many similar mid-size payments that add up to a large total. | 1,771 / 1.9% | 1,227 / 0.5% | — | 2,998 | 36 | 2,672 | 1.3% |
| 20+ small payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total tp_u21_stats_20tx_0_1k_5d Finds many small payments that together move a large sum. | 349 / 0.6% | — | — | 349 | 2 | 322 | 0.6% |
| Repeated payments just under 10,000 USD (structuring) tp_u21_structuring_9k_10k_5d Finds payments kept just below a reporting limit to avoid a report. | 554 / 2.3% | 109 / 7.1% | — | 663 | 13 | 379 | 3.3% |
| Transfer above 500 USD tp_u21_transfer_over_500 Flags every transfer over a low fixed amount, so analysts see most mid-size transfers. | 36,685 / 2.4% | 19,455 / 7.7% | 54,367 / 11.8% | 110,507 | 8,272 | 94,912 | 8.0% |
| More than 2 wire transfers in 7 days tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d Finds a sender who uses wire transfers unusually often. | 653 / 0.0% | — | — | 653 | 0 | 528 | 0.0% |
| Wire transfers above 4,999 USD in total within 7 days tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d Finds a sender who moves a large total by wire in one week. | 505 / 0.0% | — | — | 505 | 0 | 368 | 0.0% |
Proposals per business line
Bank transfers
25 proposals. Evidence, effect and caveats: this line's technical report.
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d: 0.5% of its 39,145 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d: 0.0% of its 528 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_stats_20tx_0_1k_5d: 0.6% of its 324 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d: 0.9% of its 13,477 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d: 0.0% of its 368 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h: 0.5% of its 13,871 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Large loans are taken and repaid again and again
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: A large first payment to a payee never paid before
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closes
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Activity at hours unusual for the customer
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: An older customer suddenly sends a large amount to a new payee
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change often
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Credits from many different banks into one account
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Many senders' accounts share one beneficiary
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit)
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar users
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: The payee name does not match and the payment still goes
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: The payment reference mentions investment, crypto or a 'safe account'
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictions
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the time
SEPA transfers
26 proposals. Evidence, effect and caveats: this line's technical report.
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h: 2.9% of its 621 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d: 2.1% of its 575 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d: 0.5% of its 1,042 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d: 4.0% of its 3,817 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Large loans are taken and repaid again and again
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity
- Review a rule that lost precision: Review rule tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d: its fraud share fell from 7.7% to 0.0%
- Review a rule that lost precision: Review rule tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d: its fraud share fell from 1.5% to 0.0%
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: A large first payment to a payee never paid before
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closes
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Activity at hours unusual for the customer
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: An older customer suddenly sends a large amount to a new payee
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change often
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Credits from many different banks into one account
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Many senders' accounts share one beneficiary
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit)
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Money goes round in a circle between accounts within days
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar users
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: The payee name does not match and the payment still goes
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: The payment reference mentions investment, crypto or a 'safe account'
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictions
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the time
Mobile money
25 proposals. Evidence, effect and caveats: this line's technical report.
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d: 2.4% of its 28,140 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retire the rule: Retire rule tp_u21_transfer_over_500: 11.8% of its 51,693 alerts with a known outcome were fraud
- Retune the threshold: Raise the review score from 1 to 2: 927 fewer alerts in the backtest
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Large loans are taken and repaid again and again
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity
- Merge overlapping rules: Merge rule tp_u21_transfer_over_500 into tp_u21_large_txn_9k: they overlap on 96.9% of their alerts
- Review a rule that lost precision: Review rule tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d: its fraud share fell from 31.3% to 7.2%
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: A large first payment to a payee never paid before
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closes
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Activity at hours unusual for the customer
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: An older customer suddenly sends a large amount to a new payee
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change often
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Credits from many different banks into one account
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Many senders' accounts share one beneficiary
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit)
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Money goes round in a circle between accounts within days
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar users
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: The payee name does not match and the payment still goes
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: The payment reference mentions investment, crypto or a 'safe account'
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictions
- Add a missing fraud type: Add a rule for: Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the time
What changed since the previous report
- Bank transfers: No previous report was given, so this report is treated as the first one. There is nothing to compare with yet. The next run can compare with this one: give it this folder with --previous.
- SEPA transfers: No previous report was given, so this report is treated as the first one. There is nothing to compare with yet. The next run can compare with this one: give it this folder with --previous.
- Mobile money: No previous report was given, so this report is treated as the first one. There is nothing to compare with yet. The next run can compare with this one: give it this folder with --previous.
Coverage by fraud type
Fraud types present in your labels
| Fraud type | Labelled cases | Caught | Missed | Library types it matches | Your rules' coverage | WoWyrd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Account takeover | 698 | 535 | 163 | none | SEPA transfers: Covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Purchase scam | 539 | 210 | 329 | none | SEPA transfers: Partly covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Safe-account scam | 331 | 330 | 1 | none | SEPA transfers: Covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Investment scam | 299 | 285 | 14 | none | SEPA transfers: Covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Invoice redirection | 210 | 210 | 0 | none | SEPA transfers: Covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Spread, then collect | 98 | 97 | 1 | Money comes in and leaves fast, little balance stays (UA-NBU-S06), Most of an incoming amount leaves again within hours (OR-02) | Covered (every line) | WoWyrd rule available: Money leaves soon after it arrives rapid_pass_through |
| Layers of accounts | 86 | 83 | 3 | none | Bank transfers: Covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Collect, then spread | 84 | 83 | 1 | Money comes in and leaves fast, little balance stays (UA-NBU-S06), Most of an incoming amount leaves again within hours (OR-02), Many small credits, then one large debit (OR-13) | Covered (every line) | WoWyrd rule available: Money leaves soon after it arrives rapid_pass_through; Many small credits, then one large payout many_small_credits_then_large_payout |
| One out to many (fan-out) | 83 | 83 | 0 | One payer sends to far more payees than similar payers (UA-NBU-S15), One account pays many new beneficiaries (OR-07) | Covered (every line) | WoWyrd rule available: One account pays many different payees account_many_payees |
| Many into one (fan-in) | 54 | 52 | 2 | Many payers send to one payee, far more than for similar payees (UA-NBU-S16), Many different senders pay one account within a short time (OR-01) | Covered (every line) | WoWyrd rule available: Many senders pay one account inbound_sender_fan_in; One payee shared by several customers beneficiary_reuse |
| Two groups paying each other | 49 | 47 | 2 | none | Bank transfers: Covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Money in a circle | 44 | 43 | 1 | Money goes round in a circle between accounts within days (OR-11) | Bank transfers: Covered; SEPA transfers: Not covered; Mobile money: Not covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Random hops | 41 | 40 | 1 | none | Bank transfers: Covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Money mule | 1 | 0 | 1 | none | SEPA transfers: Not covered | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Type not given | 6,581 | 6,526 | 55 | none | Unknown | WoWyrd rule: planned |
Not in this dataset, so it cannot be measured here
Your labels hold no case of these types, so this data cannot show whether your rules catch them. This is not a gap in your rules. The rules column lists catalogue rules whose names match the type.
| Library type | ID | Your rules whose names match | Sources | WoWyrd |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| One user holds many more accounts or cards than similar users | UA-NBU-S01 | none | UA-NBU-S01 | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| One type of operation makes up an unusual share of a user's activity | UA-NBU-S02 | none | UA-NBU-S02 | WoWyrd rule available: One type of operation dominates an account operation_type_concentration |
| Many operations of one type in a short time, incoming or outgoing | UA-NBU-S03 | tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d | UA-NBU-S03 | WoWyrd rule available: Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h; A burst of operations of one type same_operation_type_burst |
| Balance stays low although large amounts pass through | UA-NBU-S04 | tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h | UA-NBU-S04 | WoWyrd rule available: Large amounts pass through an account that keeps a low balance low_balance_high_turnover |
| Large loans are taken and repaid again and again | UA-NBU-S05 | none | UA-NBU-S05 | WoWyrd rule available: Large loans taken and repaid again and again loan_issue_repayment_churn |
| Gambling winnings arrive with no deposits, then card transfers follow | UA-NBU-S07 | none | UA-NBU-S07 | WoWyrd rule available: Gambling winnings with no gambling deposits gambling_winnings_without_deposits |
| Regular transfers to a personal account look like business activity | UA-NBU-S08 | none | UA-NBU-S08 | WoWyrd rule available: A personal account paid by many payers personal_account_business_activity |
| A new merchant's volume is far above similar merchants, then the merchant closes | UA-NBU-S09 | none | UA-NBU-S09 | WoWyrd rule available: A merchant with little history suddenly busy low_history_merchant_spike |
| Merchant account inflows mirror its outflows (transit) | UA-NBU-S10 | none | UA-NBU-S10 | WoWyrd rule available: A business account pays out almost all it receives business_account_transit |
| Payment purposes do not fit the merchant's category code | UA-NBU-S11 | none | UA-NBU-S11 | WoWyrd rule available: Payment purpose does not fit the merchant's business payment_purpose_atypical_for_mcc; Card payment to a person without category or purpose acquiring_to_person_missing_data |
| Contacts, device, apps, IMEI, operating system or network address change often | UA-NBU-S12 | none | UA-NBU-S12 | WoWyrd rule available: Payout right after an email or phone change contact_change_to_payout; One session from several network addresses session_multiple_ips; One account used from many devices account_many_devices |
| One device fingerprint is used by unrelated users | UA-NBU-S13 | none | UA-NBU-S13 | WoWyrd rule available: One device used by several customers multi_account_device |
| Two operations are too far apart to travel between in the time | UA-NBU-S14 | none | UA-NBU-S14 | WoWyrd rule available: Locations too far apart for the time between them impossible_travel |
| A new account gets large or many credits soon after opening | OR-03 | tp_ffiec_new_account_large_30d | UNIT21, UK-FINANCE | WoWyrd rule available: A new account receives a large credit new_account_large_incoming_credit; A new account paid by several people new_account_inbound_fan_in |
| A dormant account suddenly moves large amounts | OR-04 | tp_u21_dormant_100d_5k | FFIEC-APPF | WoWyrd rule: planned |
| Repeated amounts just under a reporting or limit threshold | OR-05 | tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d, tp_u21_stats_20tx_0_1k_5d, tp_u21_structuring_9k_10k_5d | FFIEC-APPF | WoWyrd rule available: Payments just under a limit just_below_threshold_payment; Many small payments from one account add up to a large sum amount_structuring_account; Many small payments to one payee add up to a large sum amount_structuring_beneficiary |
| Repeated round amounts with no business reason | OR-06 | tp_ffiec_round_amounts | FFIEC-APPF | WoWyrd rule available: Several payments in large round amounts repeated_round_amounts |
| Outgoing payments per hour above the customer's usual level | OR-08 | tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31d | UNIT21, EBA-GL-2021-02 | WoWyrd rule available: More payments in an hour than the customer usually makes high_customer_velocity_1h; Many requests from one account in an hour, then a payout payout_velocity_1h |
| A large first payment to a payee never paid before | OR-09 | none | UK-FINANCE, UK-PSR | WoWyrd rule available: A large payment to a payee added just before new_payee_high_amount |
| Many senders' accounts share one beneficiary | OR-10 | none | WOWYRD-SPIKE, FINCEN | WoWyrd rule available: One payee shared by several customers beneficiary_reuse |
| An amount far above the customer's own history | OR-12 | tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31d | EBA-GL-2021-02, NBU-DRAFT | WoWyrd rule available: A payment far above the customer's usual amount amount_far_above_customer_average |
| Credits from many different banks into one account | OR-14 | none | FIU-UA, FINCEN | WoWyrd rule available: Credits from many different banks into one account inbound_from_many_banks |
| Transfers to or from high-risk jurisdictions | OR-15 | none | FATF-REF, FFIEC-APPF | WoWyrd rule available: A payment to or from a high-risk country high_risk_jurisdiction_counterparty |
| Cash withdrawn right after a credit arrives | OR-16 | tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31d | FINCEN, FIU-UA | WoWyrd rule available: Cash taken out soon after money arrives cash_withdrawal_after_credit |
| The payee name does not match and the payment still goes | OR-17 | none | UK-PSR, EU-PSR | WoWyrd rule available: Paid although the payee name did not match payee_name_mismatch_paid |
| The payment reference mentions investment, crypto or a 'safe account' | OR-18 | none | UK-FINANCE | WoWyrd rule available: The payment reference uses common scam wording payment_reference_scam_wording |
| An older customer suddenly sends a large amount to a new payee | OR-19 | none | FINCEN | WoWyrd rule available: An older customer sends a large amount to a new payee older_customer_new_payee_large |
| Activity at hours unusual for the customer | OR-20 | none | NBU-DRAFT | WoWyrd rule available: Activity at an hour unusual for the customer unusual_hour_for_customer |
Incoming payments and money-mule signs
Each business line is measured on its own files; each line's own report has the detail.
| Business line | Incoming credits in your rule log | A rule fired on them | Accounts with a money-mule sign | A rule fired on them |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bank transfers | Incoming payments not measured: your transactions file has no direction column (for example direction, with values such as in and out). | — | — | — |
| SEPA transfers | 91.3% | 0.0% | 7 | 0 |
| Mobile money | Incoming payments not measured: your transactions file has no direction column (for example direction, with values such as in and out). | — | — | — |
New accounts and onboarding rating
Each business line is measured on its own files; each line's own report has the detail.
| Business line | Payments from accounts 30 days old or younger | Alerts per 1,000 of those payments |
|---|---|---|
| SEPA transfers | 41.9% | 717.8 |
Requirements changed since the last review
Your rules are mapped to current requirements. We flag when a new requirement affects them. We follow official publications of regulators in Ukraine, the EU, the UK and the US.
Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.
Requirements library read on 2026-11-11. No change file was given for this run, so no changed requirement is listed here.
Regulatory checks by regulator
Not legal advice. This report maps your rules to requirements, in our own short wording. It is not legal advice. You decide how you comply.
Regulatory statuses as of 2026-11-11 (library date). Check them again before you rely on this report.
Grouped by regulator. Our own short wording, not the regulator's text. Each line is checked on its own files; its own technical report gives the finding and the evidence.
Checks per NBU requirements
Rows citing the NBU draft of 17.07.2026 — draft, not in force: its text can change before adoption. Resolutions 51, 54 and 116 are in force. Bill 16013 is a Ukrainian bill, shown here with its status.
| Requirement ID | Our wording | Result: Bank transfers | Result: SEPA transfers | Result: Mobile money | Source status | As of | Official source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UA-NBU51-01 | The acquirer passes payee (merchant) name and category code to the issuer. Check that these fields are filled in your data. Most time-relevant item: the deadline is about 20.11.2026. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU-01 | Review every rule at least monthly by back-testing it. (NBU draft §66; library item UA-NBU-01.) | Gap | Partly met | Gap | draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU-02 | Metric 1: compare how often each rule fired with how many payments were actually stopped. (NBU draft §60(1); library item UA-NBU-02.) | Partly met | Partly met | Gap | draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU-03 | Metric 2: share of fraud value that was prevented, out of all fraud value. (NBU draft §60(2); library item UA-NBU-03.) | Partly met | Partly met | Gap | draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU-04 | Set rule-effectiveness thresholds in writing. A rule under its threshold gets an immediate review. (NBU draft §62; library item UA-NBU-04.) | Gap | Gap | Gap | draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU-05 | Record a review decision for every rule: keep, adjust or cancel. (NBU draft §68–69; library item UA-NBU-05.) | Partly met | Partly met | Partly met | draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU-11 | Have evidence ready for a supervisor: documents, rules, risk markers. | Partly met | Partly met | Partly met | draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU51-02 | Show the acquirer's full name before an online payment; receipts show payee, commission, purpose and category code. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU-09 | Reconcile payment operations every day. | Partly met | Partly met | Partly met | draft (NBU draft resolution on control of payment operations, published 2026-07-17; not law) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU51-03 | Acquiring for natural persons only for allowed categories, with the required data passed to the issuer. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force since 20.05.2026; 6 months to comply (about 20.11.2026) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU54-01 | Non-bank providers that acquire payments need an authorisation; the sanctions pause has ended. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force; grace period ended 02.09.2026 | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU116-01 | Remote verification of natural persons uses the updated procedure with credit-bureau data. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force since 10.10.2026; 3 months to align internal procedures (about 10.01.2027) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-NBU116-02 | Reports to the State Financial Monitoring Service go only through the e-cabinet, with numbered registers. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force since 10.10.2026; 3 months to align internal procedures (about 10.01.2027) | 2026-11-11 | bank.gov.ua |
| UA-16013-01 | Passing cards, account access or payment data to fraudsters becomes a crime. Detect and restrict accounts used as drops. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | adopted by the Rada 28.10.2026; presidential signature not confirmed | 2026-11-11 | itd.rada.gov.ua |
Checks per EU requirements
| Requirement ID | Our wording | Result: Bank transfers | Result: SEPA transfers | Result: Mobile money | Source status | As of | Official source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU-PSR-05 | When a payee name check fails because of the payee's provider, that provider compensates the payer's provider. Keep evidence of the name check on received transfers. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | agreed, not adopted (EU Payment Services Regulation; adoption expected by 12.2026) | 2026-11-11 | oeil.europarl.europa.eu |
Checks per UK requirements
| Requirement ID | Our wording | Result: Bank transfers | Result: SEPA transfers | Result: Mobile money | Source status | As of | Official source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK-PSR-03 | A claim may carry an excess of up to 100 GBP, never for vulnerable customers. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force | 2026-11-11 | psr.org.uk |
| UK-FCA-02 | Test and review rules; a poorly calibrated rule set the firm cannot explain is poor practice. | Partly met | Partly met | Partly met | guidance in force | 2026-11-11 | fca.org.uk |
Checks per US requirements (FinCEN, NYDFS, FFIEC, Nacha, Federal Reserve)
FinCEN and Nacha items are not checked from your files in this run; the rows below are NYDFS and FFIEC items.
| Requirement ID | Our wording | Result: Bank transfers | Result: SEPA transfers | Result: Mobile money | Source status | As of | Official source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US-NYDFS-01 | Analyse scenarios, rules and thresholds on an ongoing basis. | Partly met | Partly met | Partly met | in force | 2026-11-11 | dfs.ny.gov |
| US-NYDFS-02 | Test rules before and after they go live. | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | Not measurable from these files | in force | 2026-11-11 | dfs.ny.gov |
| US-FFIEC-01 | Tune and validate monitoring; justify each threshold. | Partly met | Partly met | Partly met | guidance | 2026-11-11 | bsaaml.ffiec.gov |
Run record per business line
Bank transfers
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Input file: catalogue | 1ba1a64a09faa99994d49f08f3234ed3049002776677a9c0bf586127f873e484 | SHA-256 |
| Input file: costs | 30f762bad066b62dfcb20d236f03995ea3edf0f809c04e934cdb957f3f4de2c4 | SHA-256 |
| Input file: decisions | 4f93135d000b15749c574990d5b6d621308ff9be94c4d041d7554e31c022430c | SHA-256 |
| Input file: labels | 5300406887cc1c2d31e72f5a5ae5e77ff197767e26a261670539900ccf30716c | SHA-256 |
| Input file: transactions | 85182da32f2e942304c498041a2eb2ba71989d5c6bc63d6f8737aa49b780d121 | SHA-256 |
| Collector version | v0.7.0-11-gba7bd7b03d5199dd42d1810a9e4294cde08c03a4 | git commit |
| Generation time | 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC | run time |
| cutoff | 2022-09-18T09:55:00+00:00 | client |
| label delay days | 7 | client |
| min cell | 10 | default |
| min join coverage | 0.95 | default |
| period | day | client |
| threshold | not given | not given |
| tokens for all rules | False | default |
| Regulatory library | 2026-11-11 | statuses as of this date |
| Requirement change file | not given | --changes |
| Tool map | not given | --tools or a tool column in the catalogue |
| Ledger export | not given | --ledger |
| Reference set source | built into this collector | |
| Reference set version | v0.7.0 | published 2026-11-18 |
| Reference set file | e96e792983d3748de554ba3b49a15291c8d4110f1778795555caff0fa81ee119 | SHA-256 |
SEPA transfers
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Input file: catalogue | df35f17dbf43833a1e61c25563e57f6acfacb60e533a103387a697a45eb8fc6d | SHA-256 |
| Input file: costs | 30f762bad066b62dfcb20d236f03995ea3edf0f809c04e934cdb957f3f4de2c4 | SHA-256 |
| Input file: decisions | 0a3afffefaf56d8f501b025a1204e7bda8c43b7d82eda43a80f1afc92aa0bf98 | SHA-256 |
| Input file: labels | 475a9301c1d99a63ac8076294c853809ac047bd7608793b3266de4e160ee5db7 | SHA-256 |
| Input file: transactions | eab82d5e97005ba696f800b5e3b30089593c4a590d3502f82e1a31d8caf88261 | SHA-256 |
| Collector version | v0.7.0-11-gba7bd7b03d5199dd42d1810a9e4294cde08c03a4 | git commit |
| Generation time | 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC | run time |
| cutoff | 2026-11-29T23:11:10+00:00 | client |
| label delay days | 7 | client |
| min cell | 10 | default |
| min join coverage | 0.95 | default |
| period | day | client |
| threshold | not given | not given |
| tokens for all rules | False | default |
| Regulatory library | 2026-11-11 | statuses as of this date |
| Requirement change file | not given | --changes |
| Tool map | not given | --tools or a tool column in the catalogue |
| Ledger export | not given | --ledger |
| Reference set source | built into this collector | |
| Reference set version | v0.7.0 | published 2026-11-18 |
| Reference set file | e96e792983d3748de554ba3b49a15291c8d4110f1778795555caff0fa81ee119 | SHA-256 |
| Onboarding: account-opened column | account_created_at | transactions file |
| Onboarding: band column | onboarding_risk | transactions file |
| Onboarding: band order given | low, medium, high | --onboarding-bands |
Mobile money
| Item | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Input file: catalogue | df35f17dbf43833a1e61c25563e57f6acfacb60e533a103387a697a45eb8fc6d | SHA-256 |
| Input file: costs | 30f762bad066b62dfcb20d236f03995ea3edf0f809c04e934cdb957f3f4de2c4 | SHA-256 |
| Input file: decisions | 478c1fcd2e5ea2286bace3a124f343280535660a6500a73c55df28b939000e5d | SHA-256 |
| Input file: labels | 9f116294ba8270bf7c932b4f31c59778e80e5e72f9e5d55cea96ce809553a35d | SHA-256 |
| Input file: transactions | 74b28df3ad96d7092c8b1d3293d38d9881d3bbfca834fc0c02575a66a7414ebc | SHA-256 |
| Collector version | v0.7.0-11-gba7bd7b03d5199dd42d1810a9e4294cde08c03a4 | git commit |
| Generation time | 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC | run time |
| cutoff | 2017-01-31T23:00:00+00:00 | client |
| label delay days | 7 | client |
| min cell | 10 | default |
| min join coverage | 0.95 | default |
| period | day | client |
| threshold | not given | not given |
| tokens for all rules | False | default |
| Regulatory library | 2026-11-11 | statuses as of this date |
| Requirement change file | not given | --changes |
| Tool map | not given | --tools or a tool column in the catalogue |
| Ledger export | not given | --ledger |
| Reference set source | built into this collector | |
| Reference set version | v0.7.0 | published 2026-11-18 |
| Reference set file | e96e792983d3748de554ba3b49a15291c8d4110f1778795555caff0fa81ee119 | SHA-256 |
Rule glossary
Each rule in this review, in plain words: what it detects, the fraud type it guards against, when it fires, where it comes from, and the data it needs.
10+ mid-size payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total Rule ID: tp_u21_stats_10tx_1k3k_5d
- What it detects
- Finds a burst of many similar mid-size payments that add up to a large total.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Money laundering (many similar payments); structuring
- When it fires
- 10 or more payments in 5 days, each 1,000 to 3,000 USD on average, more than 20,000 USD in total.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
20+ small payments in 5 days, over 20,000 USD in total Rule ID: tp_u21_stats_20tx_0_1k_5d
- What it detects
- Finds many small payments that together move a large sum.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Money laundering (smurfing); structuring
- When it fires
- 20 or more payments in 5 days, up to 1,000 USD each on average, more than 20,000 USD in total.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
Dormant account suddenly moves more than 5,000 USD Rule ID: tp_u21_dormant_100d_5k
- What it detects
- Finds an account that was quiet for months and then starts moving money, as when a taken-over or sold account is put to use.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Account takeover; mule account
- When it fires
- No activity for more than 100 days, then more than 5,000 USD in or out within 5 days.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
Large payment on an account less than 30 days old Rule ID: tp_ffiec_new_account_large_30d
- What it detects
- Finds big money movement on a newly opened account.
- Fraud type it guards against
- New-account fraud; mule account
- When it fires
- A payment of at least 10,000 USD where the sender or receiver account is 30 days old or less.
- Source
- FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
- Data fields it needs
- amount, account_age_days
Many small payments in, then sent out within a day Rule ID: tp_ffiec_small_in_rapid_out_24h
- What it detects
- Finds an account that collects several small payments and passes most of the money on at once.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Mule account; money laundering (pass-through)
- When it fires
- 3 or more incoming payments under 3,000 USD within 24 hours, then at least 80% of their total goes out within the same 24 hours.
- Source
- FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
Money from 5+ different senders into one account within 5 days (fan-in) Rule ID: tp_ffiec_fan_in_5_senders_5d
- What it detects
- Finds one account that collects money from many people, as a collection or mule account does.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Mule account; scam proceeds collection
- When it fires
- One receiver gets money from 5 or more different senders within 5 days.
- Source
- FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id
Money in, then almost all of it sent on within 3 days (layering) Rule ID: tp_u21_layering_10k_90pct_3d
- What it detects
- Finds an account that receives a large sum and quickly passes nearly all of it to other people.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Money laundering (layering); mule account
- When it fires
- At least 10,000 USD comes in, and at least 90% of it goes out to other receivers within 3 days.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
Money sent to 5+ different recipients within 5 days (fan-out) Rule ID: tp_u21_fan_out_5_benef_5d
- What it detects
- Finds one sender spreading money to many receivers in a short time.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Money laundering (dispersal); mule network
- When it fires
- One sender pays 5 or more different receivers within 5 days.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id
More than 2 wire transfers in 7 days Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_count_gt2_7d
- What it detects
- Finds a sender who uses wire transfers unusually often.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Money laundering through wires
- When it fires
- One sender makes more than 2 wire transfers within 7 days.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, channel
Repeated large round-number transfers Rule ID: tp_ffiec_round_amounts
- What it detects
- Finds a sender who keeps sending large, round amounts (a common money-laundering sign).
- Fraud type it guards against
- Money laundering; payments with no real purchase behind them
- When it fires
- One sender makes 3 or more transfers of at least 1,000 USD in whole hundreds within 30 days.
- Source
- FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual, Appendix F red flag; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
Repeated payments just under 10,000 USD (structuring) Rule ID: tp_u21_structuring_9k_10k_5d
- What it detects
- Finds payments kept just below a reporting limit to avoid a report.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Structuring (avoiding the reporting threshold)
- When it fires
- One sender makes 2 or more payments between 9,000 and 10,000 USD within 5 days.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
Single payment above 9,000 USD Rule ID: tp_u21_large_txn_9k
- What it detects
- Flags any one large payment for a closer look.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Large-value money laundering
- When it fires
- One payment is more than 9,000 USD.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- amount
Spending in the last 3 days doubles the monthly norm Rule ID: tp_u21_hist_deviation_3d_31d
- What it detects
- Finds a sender whose recent outgoing volume jumps far above their own usual level.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Account takeover; sudden cash-out
- When it fires
- The daily average sent over the last 3 days is more than twice the daily average over the last 31 days.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library; the source gives no exact numbers, so WoWyrd chose some of them
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, receiver_id, amount
Transfer above 500 USD Rule ID: tp_u21_transfer_over_500
- What it detects
- Flags every transfer over a low fixed amount, so analysts see most mid-size transfers.
- Fraud type it guards against
- General transfer monitoring (no specific fraud type)
- When it fires
- One transfer is more than 500 USD.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- amount
Wire transfers above 4,999 USD in total within 7 days Rule ID: tp_u21_wire_total_gt4999_7d
- What it detects
- Finds a sender who moves a large total by wire in one week.
- Fraud type it guards against
- Money laundering through wires
- When it fires
- One sender's wire transfers add up to more than 4,999 USD within 7 days.
- Source
- Unit21 open rule library
- Data fields it needs
- ts, sender_id, amount, channel
Fraud types in plain words
Each fraud type named in your labels, in one sentence. The word in small grey text is the label as your file gives it.
- Account takeover ATO
- A criminal gets into a customer's account and sends money out of it.
- Collect, then spread GATHER-SCATTER
- Money from many accounts is collected in one, then sent on to many others.
- Investment scam INVEST
- The customer is talked into paying into an investment that does not exist.
- Invoice redirection INVOICE
- A false or changed invoice makes the customer pay a criminal instead of the real supplier.
- Layers of accounts STACK
- Money passes through several layers of accounts in a row, so its origin is hard to trace.
- Many into one (fan-in) FAN-IN
- Many accounts send money into one account, which collects it.
- Money in a circle CYCLE
- Money passes along a chain of accounts and comes back to the account it left.
- Money mule MULE
- An account receives stolen money and passes it on for someone else.
- One out to many (fan-out) FAN-OUT
- One account sends money out to many accounts, so it spreads thin.
- Purchase scam PURCHASE
- The customer pays for goods or services that never arrive.
- Random hops RANDOM
- Money hops between accounts along an irregular path with no fixed shape.
- Safe-account scam SAFE
- A caller who poses as the bank tells the customer to move money to an account the caller controls.
- Spread, then collect SCATTER-GATHER
- Money is split across many accounts, then collected again in one account.
- Two groups paying each other BIPARTITE
- One group of accounts pays a second group, with many payments crossing between them.
- Type not given no type
- Fraud labels in your file that do not say which kind of fraud it was.